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ARTICLES 
THE STATUS OF NONSTATUS 
GEOFFREY HEEREN* 
Millions of unauthorized immigrants in the United States have no legal 
immigration status and live in constant fear of deportation.  There are 
millions more who do have some sort of status, like lawful permanent 
residency, asylum, or a nonimmigrant visa.  In between is the netherworld of 
nonstatus.  Here live noncitizens who possess government documentation but 
few rights.  They have no pathway to lawful permanent residence or 
citizenship and cannot receive most public benefits.  If nonstatus is denied or 
revoked by a prosecutor or bureaucrat, there is no right to a hearing or an 
appeal.  If the Executive Branch discriminates in how it allocates nonstatus, 
there may not be a legal right to challenge it. 
The Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) and Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) programs 
are the most recent and largest categories of nonstatus, but there are many 
others:  parole, administrative closure, supervision, Deferred Enforced 
Departure (DED), and stays of removal, to name just a few.  What these 
categories have in common is that they are discretionary, unreviewable, 
weakly described by positive law, and officially temporary, although 
individuals often live for years or even lifetimes in the purgatory of 
nonstatus.  They occupy a paradoxical middle ground between legality and 
illegality, loosely tethered to this country by humanitarian concern or 
prosecutorial discretion.  Those with nonstatus have fewer rights and 
                                                           
 * Associate Professor, Valparaiso University Law School.  I am grateful to Ingrid Eagly, 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Juliet Stumpf, Peter Margulies, Alina Das, Stuart Ford, 
Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi and participants at a Valparaiso University Law School faculty 
workshop and at the 2014 Immigration Law Professors Workshop at the University of 
California at Irvine School of Law for their helpful comments and conversations as 
well as to the editors of the American University Law Review for their excellent edits. 
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remedies than those with immigration status.  At the same time, they must 
register, disclose biographic data, be fingerprinted, and regularly update 
their address.  Yet nonstatus is not just a government surveillance program:  
it is the only way for many individuals to claim some measure of dignity and 
legitimacy from a society that places a strong stigma on unauthorized immigrants. 
This Article will provide the first description of immigration nonstatus and its 
impact on the individuals who have it.  It will describe the growth of nonstatus 
over time and the acceleration of that growth following late-1990s immigration 
reforms that restricted the means to acquire immigration status.  The Article will 
contend that nonstatus is growing in part because it offers a means to authorize 
the presence of undocumented immigrants without offering them rights and 
benefits that have become controversial for immigrants with full status. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sergio and his brother were taking trash to the dump in their 
Honduran town when they saw a local police officer grab a woman by 
the hair and shoot her in the head.1  When the officer and his 
accomplices saw Sergio and his brother watching, they tried to shoot 
them too.  Sergio and his brother went into hiding, but the police 
found and killed Sergio’s brother a month later.  Sergio fled 
immediately after identifying his brother’s mangled body, washed up 
on a trash and sewage soaked riverbank.  He left his daughter behind 
with her mother, crossed deserts, and exhausted his financial 
resources to come to the United States. 
Once in the United States, Sergio applied for asylum.  During the 
years he waited for his final hearing, he struggled to obtain 
corroboration from his friends and family of what he had seen.  His 
two law clinic representatives worked countless hours to find 
evidence.  They retained a psychologist to evaluate Sergio for post-
traumatic stress disorder, hired an expert on police corruption in 
Honduras to testify, had voluminous documents translated from 
Spanish to English, found supporting articles and reports, and 
presented all of this evidence in a lengthy memorandum of law. 
The work took its toll on Sergio.  It was painful for him to recall the 
shooting and his brother’s death in excruciating detail as he needed 
to in order for his representatives to draft an affidavit and prepare 
him to testify.  The hours Sergio spent describing what he saw gave 
him nightmares.  He and his representatives sacrificed much to get to 
the day of the final asylum hearing.  When that day came, they 
approached it with confidence that they had done everything they 
could to get ready. 
Before they entered the courtroom, the lawyer for the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approached them.2  “I have 
                                                           
 1. The facts of Sergio’s case come from an asylum claim handled by the 
Valparaiso University Law School’s Immigration Clinic.  Although the client has 
agreed to a recitation of certain facts from his case, his name has been changed to 
protect his confidentiality. 
 2. In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which abolished the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and created the new Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), along with its various sub-agencies, including 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the primary enforcer of immigration 
law, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the primary adjudicator 
of immigration applications.  This Article will refer to INS when describing pre-2002 
events, and to DHS or its various subagencies for events occurring after 2002. 
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a one-time deal,” she offered.3  “The respondent has U.S.-citizen 
children and has been here for three years, so he meets our office’s 
criteria for prosecutorial discretion.”4  She went on to explain that 
her office had been instructed to assess its docket for cases that could 
be “administratively closed.”5  Sergio’s representatives had ten 
minutes to explain the offer to Sergio.  If he refused the deal, DHS 
would not renew the offer if he lost his asylum case.  Therefore, he 
would be deported. 
The representatives explained DHS’s offer to Sergio as well as they 
could in the short time they had.  The removal case would not go 
away:  it would just be taken off of the court’s docket.  Sergio could 
probably renew his work permit every year because of his asylum 
application’s pending status.  But, as long as the case was 
administratively closed, he would not receive asylum.  He could not 
petition for his daughter in Honduras to join him in the United 
States, meaning he would probably never see her again.  If DHS’s 
prosecutorial discretion priorities changed in the future, perhaps as a 
result of the election of a different U.S. President, DHS might renew 
its effort to deport Sergio. 
Sergio rejected the offer.  He wanted to bring his daughter to the 
United States where she would be safe, and without asylum, he would 
have no clear way to do so.6  The decision ended up being a good one 
for him:  he went on to eventually win his asylum case. 
However, an increasing number of people subject to removal 
proceedings are agreeing to the type of deal that Sergio rejected.  
The Obama Administration’s 2011 prosecutorial discretion initiative 
has resulted in about 29,000 removal cases being administratively 
closed.7  The program was originally intended as a means to drop 
cases against noncitizens with close family, educational, or other ties 
in the United States to spend the DHS’s limited resources on 
individuals who pose a serious threat to public safety or national 
                                                           
 3. Summary of Hearing, Valparaiso University Law School Immigration Clinic 
Case No. 14-0000051, March 20, 2014. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Once Intended to Reduce Immigration Court Backlog, Prosecutorial Discretion 
Closures Continue Unabated, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Jan. 15, 
2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/339 [hereinafter TRAC] (reporting 
that prosecutorial discretion is used to administratively close Immigration Court 
cases in an effort to reduce court backlog). 
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security.8  However, Sergio’s case and other anecdotal evidence 
suggest that many administratively closed cases involve individuals 
who could have qualified for a more secure immigration status, such 
as asylum.9  To avoid the risk of deportation, these applicants take 
administrative closure, which forces them into an immigration 
purgatory that might allow work but not a pathway to legal 
permanent residency or citizenship.  They lack the ability to 
naturalize and the rights to vote and to participate in civil society that 
go with it, the privilege to seek government benefits like social 
security retirement enjoyed by lawful permanent residents (LPRs), 
and even the ability to freely travel afforded temporary visa holders.  
As far as the government is concerned, their presence in the United 
States is by virtue of prosecutorial discretion only, and they lack any 
actual “lawful status.” 
These tens of thousands of individuals may not be “in status,” but 
they are not at risk of deportation either.  They are in an in-between 
state, a limbo that this Article will call “nonstatus.”  The first goal of 
this Article is to define nonstatus.  This Article will strive to offer a 
clear definition, description, and taxonomy of this newly identified 
category.  It will define nonstatus as possessing three principal 
attributes.  First, nonstatus is officially temporary and does not offer a 
pathway to citizenship.  Second, nonstatus is tentative:  its holders 
have few rights—substantive or procedural—and as a result, they live 
in a state of perpetual uncertainty.  Relatedly, the positive law that 
circumscribes nonstatus is often hazy:  there are few statutes that 
describe how to obtain it. 
There are a host of immigration categories that meet all or most of 
the elements of this definition:  deferred action, deferred enforced 
departure (DED), extended voluntary departure (EVD), temporary 
protected status (TPS), withholding of removal, deferral of removal, 
                                                           
 8. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief 
Counsel 1, 4 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter June 2011 Morton Memo], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf 
(describing factors to be considered for when exercising prosecutorial discretion). 
 9. The author surveyed other clinical professors of immigration law concerning 
this issue and received several responses stating that DHS commonly offers 
prosecutorial discretion in cases where noncitizens are eligible for other relief.  One 
New York-based clinician noted that DHS commonly offers prosecutorial discretion 
in strong asylum cases.  See iclinic@list.msu.edu Listserv Exchange (Apr. 1, 2014–Apr. 
3, 2014) (on file with author). 
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and stays of removal.10  The many names for nonstatus all emphasize 
its transitory nature, but people can and do live for years or even 
lifetimes in the United States within these categories without the rights 
afforded to lawful residents.  These individuals occupy a paradoxical 
middle ground between legality and illegality, loosely tethered to 
this country by humanitarian concern or prosecutorial discretion. 
The United States has offered nonstatus since at least the 1920s 
and has categorically doled it out to thousands of persons at a time 
since the 1950s.11  But, in recent years, the United States has 
expanded the number of persons placed in nonstatus.12  Beginning in 
the late 1990s, the nonstatus of “deferred action” began to evolve 
from an esoteric benefit offered on a very limited case-by-case basis to 
a means for granting lawful presence and work permits to thousands 
of undocumented immigrants at a time.13  The government has 
recently released more and more deported persons with “orders of 
supervision” allowing them to stay in the United States, resulting in a 
population that now numbers well over 600,000 individuals.14  This 
increase in nonstatus culminated with the Obama Administration’s 
controversial DACA and DAPA programs that could benefit as many 
as four million immigrants if they survive litigation challenges and 
congressional hostility.15 
                                                           
 10. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.6 (2014) (setting out the requirements for an 
administrative stay of removal); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 264–65 (2010) (explaining 
the development of and distinctions between Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), 
Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD), and Temporary Protected Status). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II.F. 
 14. The author filed a Freedom of Information Act Request with ICE on April 1, 
2014 for data from 2002 to the present “about the number and types of cases in 
which ICE has granted removable non-citizens some form of relief, broadly 
construed, from removal.”  Letter from Geoffrey Heeren, Assistant Professor, 
Valparaiso Univ. Law Sch., to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Apr. 1, 
2014) (on file with author).  In response, ICE disclosed statistics concerning persons 
released on orders of supervision, stays of removal, extended voluntary departure, 
and deferred action from Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 through FY 2014.  The data reveals 
that there were 613,578 individuals under ICE supervision in FY 2014.  Enforcement 
& Removal Office LESA Statistical Tracking Unit, FOIA 14-15328 Relief from 
Removal (response to Freedom of Information Act Request filed by Geoffrey 
Heeren) [hereinafter ICE FOIA Response](on file with author). 
 15. David Nakamura, Obama Acts on Immigration, Announcing Decision to Defer 
Deportations of 4 Million, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/obama-acts-on-immigration-announcing-decision-to-defer-deportations-of-4-
million/2014/11/20/9a5c3856-70f6-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.html.  As of this 
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There are several reasons for the growth of nonstatus.  Many 
unauthorized immigrants have strong moral claims to full status but 
are cut off from it by legal standards that have become increasingly 
strict since the late-1990s immigration reforms.16  There is a 
bipartisan consensus that the immigration system is “broken,” but 
Congress has repeatedly failed in its efforts to reform immigration 
law,17 leaving even unauthorized immigrants with very sympathetic 
claims ineligible for status.  One reason why reform is so difficult is 
that the provision of rights and benefits to immigrants is 
controversial.18  Thus, nonstatus, which comes with few real rights 
and benefits, offers a way to authorize the presence of 
undocumented immigrants without undertaking the politically 
hazardous task of incorporating them into the mainstream of 
American rights and privileges. 
Part I of this Article develops definitions for status, the lack of 
status, and nonstatus and suggests that the three make up a fluid 
continuum.  Part II provides a more complete portrait of nonstatus, 
including the types of nonstatus and numbers of individuals with it 
and the different actors and interest groups involved in nonstatus:  
bureaucrats, politicians, judges, and private corporations.  Part III 
discusses the meaning of nonstatus for those who have it and society 
at large.  Without stating definite conclusions, this Article offers a 
warning.  If nonstatus is limbo, it cannot last forever, and the pathway 
the United States takes from it will, to a large extent, determine 
whether the United States is an egalitarian society. 
                                                           
writing, DAPA is subject to a federal court injunction that has prevented it from 
going forward.  See generally Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015). 
 16. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration 
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 517 (2009) (“In recent years, Congress has made the 
system of deportation more categorical, eliminating many avenues of relief from 
removal that in earlier periods were available to noncitizens who engaged in 
deportable conduct.”). 
 17. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42980, BRIEF HISTORY OF 
COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM EFFORTS IN THE 109TH AND 110TH 
CONGRESSES TO INFORM POLICY DISCUSSIONS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 1 (2013), 
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42980.pdf; Jaime Fuller, Americans 
Are Ready for Immigration Reform.  They Are Just Not Ready Enough, WASH. POST 
(July 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/14/ 
americans-are-ready-for-immigration-reform-they-are-just-not-ready-enough. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
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I. DEFINITIONS 
Ceci n’est pas une pipe. 
-  René Magritte19 
According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a 
grant of deferred action means that a person is not unlawfully 
present but does not mean that the person has lawful status.20  
Indeed, USCIS insists that deferred action is not an “immigration 
status” at all.21  A status that is neither lawful nor unlawful and that is 
not even a status at all may make some sense to attorneys who have 
been deeply immersed in the illogic of immigration law.22  However, 
to everyone else, it may sound like a riddle.  This Part will address 
USCIS’s unintentional riddle head-on:  what is it that is not status 
and not no status? 
A. Status 
To answer this riddle, one must first know what immigration status 
is.  In English, the word means both a rank or classification and a 
high rank.23  If one has status, in other words, one enjoys a high 
standing.  In immigration law, status means that, too.  Short of 
citizenship, the best status is “lawful permanent resident,” a category 
                                                           
 19. From the painting by René Magritte, La trahison des images (The Treachery of 
Images) (depicting a pipe). 
 20. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process:  Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/ 
consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions 
(last updated Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter DACA FAQ]. 
 21. Adjustment of Status; Certain Nationals of the People’s Republic of China, 62 
Fed. Reg. 63,249, 63,253 (Nov. 28, 1997) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 245) (“Deferred 
action recognizes that the Service has limited enforcement resources and that every 
attempt should be made administratively to use these resources in a manner which 
will achieve the greatest impact under the immigration laws.  Deferred action does 
not confer any immigration status on an alien, nor is it in any way a reflection of an 
alien’s lawful immigration status. . . .  Since deferred action is not an immigration 
status, no alien has the right to deferred action.  It is used solely for the 
administrative convenience of, and in the discretion of, the Service and confers no 
protection or benefit on an alien.  Deferred action does not preclude the Service 
from commencing removal proceedings at any time against an alien.”). 
 22. There is a distinction in immigration law between “unlawful presence” and 
“unlawful status.”  The former is a term of art that is relevant to the ground of 
inadmissibility for individuals who have accrued 180 days or more of unlawful 
presence.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2012) (defining the term unlawful presence 
and stating that those individuals are inadmissible). 
 23. Status, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/ 
search.html?q=status (last visited May 11, 2015). 
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first codified into law in 1952.24  LPRs can legally work, travel into 
and out of the United States, access various government benefits, 
and eventually become citizens.25  For those who do not wish to 
apply for citizenship, the status does not expire.26  Courts have held 
that LPRs are also entitled to Fifth Amendment and other 
constitutional protections.27 
However, status does not end with LPRs.  There is a headache-
inducing excess of immigration categories.  Just below LPRs on the 
immigration hierarchy, one might place refugees and asylees, who 
have established that they have a “well-founded fear” of future 
persecution in their country of origin.28  Refugees and asylees are 
entitled to work, to receive a variety of public benefits, and to “adjust 
status” after a year to become LPRs.29  In 2012, there were about 
20,790,000 LPRs, refugees, and asylees in the United States.30 
Another large immigration category consists of temporary 
“nonimmigrant” visas for tourists, businesspersons, students, 
temporary workers, athletes, and many others.31  In 2012 there were 
about 1,870,000 nonimmigrants in the United States.32  Most 
nonimmigrants remain for short periods and have few rights, putting 
them close to the bottom of the hierarchy of immigration statuses.33  
                                                           
 24. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1952) (“The term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence’ means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing 
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”). 
 25. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens:  
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 93–94 (2002). 
 26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012). 
 27. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33, 35 (1982) (instructing courts to 
grant LPRs procedures that satisfy the minimum requirements of due process upon 
reentering the U.S.); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (noting 
that LPRs who are physically present in the United States may not be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law). 
 28. See generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 6–7 
(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing the UN Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees definition of “refugee”). 
 29. 8 C.F.R. §§ 209.1–209.2 (2014). 
 30. BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF 
THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES:  JANUARY 
2012 4 tbl.2 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf. 
 31. See generally 2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
§ 12.01[1] (2014). 
 32. BAKER & RYTINA, supra note 30, at 4 tbl.2. 
 33. 2 GORDON ET AL., supra note 31, § 12.01[1] (explaining that individuals with 
nonimmigrant visas are permitted to remain in the United States for the duration of 
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For example, the government famously revoked the nonimmigrant 
visas of all Iranian Americans in the United States after the Iran 
Hostage crisis in 1980.34 
Status is malleable.  It is possible to enter the United States with a 
status—for example, a nonimmigrant visa—and to overstay its period 
of authorized stay, meaning that one would begin with status but 
become unauthorized.35  It is also possible to enter the United States 
without inspection,36 meaning that one would be an unauthorized 
immigrant upon entering the country.  Yet, that person might later 
obtain status through one of various routes.  Even an unauthorized 
immigrant who has been ordered deported can sometimes obtain 
status through one of these processes.37 
The means to acquire immigration status can be opaque and 
sometimes even seemingly arbitrary.  There are innumerable 
bureaucratic and ministerial requirements, a host of niggling 
distinctions, and often ridiculously long wait times.  For example, one 
of the most common routes by which immigrants obtain LPR status is 
through a relationship to a U.S.-citizen family member.  The U.S.-
citizen family member can file a petition to have her familial 
relationship legally recognized by DHS.38  Once the relationship is 
recognized, the noncitizen must wait for a visa to become available.39  
After the visa becomes available, she can file a lengthy and 
burdensome application for it.40 
                                                           
an authorized stay and to engage in activities that are compatible with their 
nonimmigrant statuses). 
 34. PUB. AFFAIRS ALLIANCE OF IRANIAN AMS., IRANIAN AMERICANS:  IMMIGRATION AND 
ASSIMILATION 6 (2014), available at http://www.paaia.org/CMS/Data/Sites/1/pdfs/ 
iranian-americans---immigration-and-assimilation.pdf. 
 35. See infra Part I.B (explaining how individuals become unauthorized). 
 36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012) (stating that noncitizens present in the 
United States without having been inspected are inadmissible); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1 
(2014) (setting out procedures for inspection of applicants for admission to the 
United States). 
 37. See In re Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (BIA 2002) (holding that a 
properly filed motion to reopen a removal case may be granted to allow a noncitizen 
to apply for adjustment of status in certain situations). 
 38. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 39. See Visa Bulletin:  Immigrant Numbers for September 2014, U.S. DEP’T STATE 1 
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/ 
visabulletin_september2014.pdf (explaining that visas are allocated in chronological 
order of priority date and that certain categories are oversubscribed because not all 
demand can be met). 
 40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or 
Adjust Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/i-485 (last 
visited May 11, 2015). 
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The average wait for a visa ranges from a couple months to a 
couple decades, depending on the nature of the relationship and the 
family member’s country of origin.  Long wait times are common 
because visas are allocated based on a formula that allots the same 
number of visas to every country in the world, regardless of how many 
people want to come to the United States from that country.41  The 
result is lengthy wait times—often decades long—for individuals from 
certain countries.42  The longest wait times are reserved for those 
countries that have the most nationals looking to immigrate to the 
United States, such as Mexico.43 
While the beneficiaries of these visa petitions are waiting for their 
visas to become current, do they have status?  In a way, they do 
because they can obtain work permission if they are in the United 
States.  Yet, there is no official name for the status they enjoy.44  
Prior to obtaining a green card, many will have to leave the United 
States to return to their home countries, where they may face 
additional legal hurdles and wait times.45  Many will eventually have 
their applications denied because they will be found inadmissible 
on the basis of criminal convictions, financial instability, health 
issues, or past immigration violations, further clarifying that 
whatever status they thought they had was at best a chimera.46  
Professor David Martin has described this group of long-suffering 
applicants, which numbers in the hundreds of thousands, as having 
a kind of “twilight status.”47 
                                                           
 41. “[N]o more than seven percent of the worldwide allotments for visas or 
adjustments to permanent residence may be made available during any fiscal year to 
the natives of a single foreign state.”  3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 31, § 31.02[3][a]. 
 42. See, e.g., Visa Bulletin:  Immigrant Numbers for September 2014, supra note 39 
(showing wait times of up to twenty-three years). 
 43. See id. (indicating that individuals seeking F4 visas from the Philippines wait 
up to twenty-three years for their visas). 
 44. See David A. Martin, Twilight Statuses:  A Closer Examination of the 
Unauthorized Population, 2 MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 1, 4–5 (2005), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/twilight-statuses-closer-examination-
unauthorized-population. 
 45. Marisa S. Cianciarulo, Seventeen Years Since the Sunset:  The Expiration of 245(i) 
and Its Effect on U.S. Citizens Married to Undocumented Immigrants, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 
451, 452 (2015). 
 46. Id. at 456; Martin, supra note 44, at 3. 
 47. See Martin, supra note 44, at 2.  Professor Martin’s term, “twilight status,” 
poetically captures the liminal status of the 1–1.5 million persons whom he estimated 
“have current or incipient claims to legal status in the United States because they are 
either relatives of lawful permanent residents or have been granted temporary 
protected status.”  Id.  It is important to note that this population differs from the 
HEEREN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:55 PM 
1126 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1115 
B. No Status 
Presented with a Sisyphean process for legally immigrating, many 
immigrants enter the United States without inspection.  Others enter 
legally but overstay their visas.  These two groups comprise the 
approximately 11.5 million noncitizens in the United States without 
status who are often described as “illegal,” “undocumented,” or 
“unauthorized” noncitizens.48 
The number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States 
today may be at an all-time high, yet there have always been more 
unauthorized immigrants in the United States than the government 
has the resources to deport.  Indeed, for much of the twentieth 
century, the United States tolerated or even welcomed unauthorized 
immigrants, depending on the economic needs of the moment.49  
Many unauthorized immigrants live for years in the United States, 
building homes and families here.  They do so because the 
government’s inability and seeming unwillingness to deport all 
deportable individuals means that the question of whether any given 
immigrant will be removed is indeterminate. 
More precisely, the deportation of unauthorized immigrants is a 
matter of discretion.  As Professor Hiroshi Motomura has noted, 
“[w]hether they are ultimately deported depends on countless 
decisions by government officials who exercise discretion, always 
aware of political and economic pressures, and often in ways that 
can be inconsistent, unpredictable, and sometimes, discriminatory.”50  
It is worth highlighting this last point about the sometimes 
arbitrary or even discriminatory quality of immigration enforcement.  
For unauthorized immigrants who live in a state of constant 
uncertainty, it is this uneven aspect of enforcement that must seem 
most disturbing. 
                                                           
nonstatus holders that this Article discusses who are more permanently in limbo due 
to the lack of any legal claim to lawful status. 
 48. BAKER & RYTINA, supra note 30, at 4 tbl.2 (estimating that there are 11,430,000 
undocumented individuals in the United States).  For a discussion of the use of the 
modifiers “illegal,” “undocumented,” and “unauthorized” with respect to immigrants, 
see Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others:  Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the 
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1786 n.2 (2010). 
 49. E.g., MAE NGAE, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:  ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 265–66 (2004) (noting that throughout its history, the United 
States has welcomed illegal immigrants for a variety of reasons, including to meet 
demand for low wage workers and for work in domestic services and housing construction). 
 50. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 22 (2014). 
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There are countless examples of arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement involving the internment, detention, or deportation of 
individuals based on their political leanings, religion, or country of 
origin.51  The “Red Scare,” Japanese Internment during World War 
II, the Iranian Hostage crisis, and the post-September 11 era all 
involved dubious crackdowns on particular immigrant groups.  
Consider a recent example.  After September 11, 2001, the 
government instituted a massive “special registration” program for 
male noncitizens over the age of sixteen who had entered the United 
States on nonimmigrant visas from twenty-five countries, all of which 
were predominately Muslim countries except for North Korea.52  In 
other words, the scope of the registration program encompassed a 
substantial part of the Muslim noncitizen population in the United 
States.  After one year of special registration under this National 
Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 83,519 
individuals were registered domestically, 13,789 registrants were 
placed in removal proceedings, and 2,870 were detained in 
immigration custody.53 
It appears that most of those who were placed in removal 
proceedings were charged with minor immigration offenses.54  The 
government only claimed that it found eleven individuals with 
                                                           
 51. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:  OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 8–10 (2007) (suggesting that the Bush Administration’s post-September 
11 deportation policy impacted many individuals who were not “terrorists”); David 
Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 989–1000 (2002) (discussing Japanese 
interment, the Palmer Raids, and efforts to deport noncitizens for their support of 
Palestinian liberation). 
 52. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433–34, 448 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that 
an NSEERS registrant who alleged the removal proceedings against him were tainted 
by NSEERS regulatory violations was not entitled to relief because he was not in the 
country legally, he did not qualify for any lawful status, and the regulatory violations 
were harmless).  DHS terminated the NSEERS program in 2011.  Removing 
Designated Countries from the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 
(NSEERS), 76 Fed. Reg. 23,830, 23,831 (Apr. 28, 2011). 
 53. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET:  CHANGES TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
ENTRY/EXIT REGISTRATION SYSTEM (NSEERS) 4 (2003) (on file with author). 
 54. Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, DHS Announces End to Controversial Post-
9/11 Immigrant Registration and Tracking Program, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 17, 
2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/dhs-announces-end-controversial-post- 
911-immigrant-registration-and-tracking-program.  The majority of NSEERS 
apprehensions involved individuals who were detained simply because they did not 
have lawful immigration status.  See PETER MARGULIES ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW:  
PRINCIPLES & POLICY 33 (forthcoming 2015). 
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connections to terrorism as a result of the program,55 and there is 
reason to suppose that those connections were attenuated.56  One 
might draw this inference from the slipshod way the government 
often used terrorism allegations to justify detention of Muslim 
noncitizens in the years following September 11.  During that period, 
the government commonly placed Muslim noncitizens in removal 
proceedings based on weak misrepresentation charges for failing to 
disclose tenuous ties to Islamic charitable organizations.57  The 
government also detained Muslim noncitizens based on flimsy 
terrorism charges, relying on the excessively overbroad language of 
the terrorism definition in the INA.58 
Widely criticized as discriminatory, NSEERS was nonetheless 
upheld as a rational exercise of the government’s plenary power over 
alien exclusion and national security matters.59  The available data 
lends support to the argument that the government used NSEERS 
and its other deportation powers after September 11 to try to deport 
every male Muslim noncitizen with a colorable immigration violation, 
including almost one out of every five individuals who registered 
through NSEERS. 
By contrast, the government declined to exercise its deportation 
powers against many other types of noncitizens during the same 
period.  For example, in 2007, President Bush decided to grant DED 
to Liberian nationals who had been living in the United States with 
tenuous legal status since that country’s brutal civil war in the late-
1980s and the 1990s.60  As a result of the DED designation, Liberians 
                                                           
 55. Rachel L. Swarns, Special Registration for Arab Immigrants Will Reportedly Stop, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at A16 (reporting that the program ended amidst 
concerns from civil liberties groups and government officials that the program was 
not effective). 
 56. E.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security 
After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 
1383–84 (2007) (asserting that the Bush Administration’s discontinuation of the 
program suggests that it never resulted in any significant leads in the war on terror). 
 57. Id. at 1384. 
 58. See CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE ET AL., UNDER THE RADAR:  
MUSLIMS DEPORTED, DETAINED, AND DENIED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED TERRORISM 
ALLEGATIONS 3, 5–6 (2011), available at http://aaldef.org/UndertheRadar.pdf 
(noting that NSEERS and other similar programs have produced “wide-scale 
racial profiling”). 
 59. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We therefore join 
every circuit that has considered the issue in concluding that the Program does not 
violate Equal Protection guarantees.”). 
 60. See Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization and Related 
Documentation for Liberians Provided Deferred Enforced Departure, 72 Fed. Reg. 
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could remain in the United States and legally work, even though 
they did not technically have any immigration status.61  The 
government passed over many other unauthorized groups and 
individuals during the same time period, leading some to contend 
that the government was engaged in a program of selective 
prosecution against noncitizen Muslim males.62 
C. Nonstatus 
If the government exercises its discretion and does not deport an 
unauthorized immigrant, what is that individual’s status?  The 
government would likely answer that such individuals have no status 
or at least that they do not have lawful status.  Consider the Liberians 
granted DED in 2007.  According to USCIS, DED “is not considered 
an immigration ‘status.’”63  However, individuals with DED can obtain 
a federal work permit that they can use as an ID card.  Obviously, 
then, they are not “undocumented” nor “unauthorized” or “illegal” 
because the government has recognized their presence and 
authorized them to remain in the country. 
If DED is somewhere between status and no status, then it is the 
answer to our riddle:  that which is not status and not no status.  In 
other words, DED is “nonstatus.”  One way to illustrate the attributes 
of nonstatus is by considering those of DED.  First, DED is temporary:  
                                                           
53,596, 53,596 (Sept. 19, 2007) (extending automatically Employment Authorization 
Documents for Liberians for eighteen months). 
 61. Id.  Many Liberian nationals have lived in the United States with TPS since 
the 1990s, when Liberia was engaged in a bloody civil war.  LISA SEGHETTI ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS:  CURRENT 
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ISSUES 6–7 (2015), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
homesec/RS20844.pdf.  In 2007, the Bush Administration ended TPS for the 
Liberians who had lived in the United States since the war but decided to instead 
offer them DED.  Id.  On November 21, 2014, DHS redesignated Liberia for TPS 
until May 20, 2015 because of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia.  Press Release, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Temporary Protected Status Designations for 
Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, DHS 
DED], available at http://www.uscis.gov/news/dhs-announces-temporary-protected-
status-designations-liberia-guinea-and-sierra-leone. 
 62. See Rashad Hussain, Note, Preventing the New Internment:  A Security-Sensitive 
Standard for Equal Protection Claims in the Post-9/11 Era, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 117, 147–
48 (2007) (noting that the program seemed to target individuals of South Asian, 
Arab, or Muslim descent; that the policies never resulted in any terrorism-related 
arrests; and that the practice violated the government’s own position on profiling). 
 63. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES 
MANUAL 39 (2013) [hereinafter AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL], available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/Asylum_Procedures
_Manual_2013.pdf. 
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it has been periodically renewed for Liberians since 2007 and was 
most recently authorized for Liberians for a twenty-four month 
period beginning on October 1, 2014.64  The most recent 
announcement came just four days before the last round of DED 
was set to expire.65  Individuals with DED live in a state of perpetual 
uncertainty.  Thus, the first aspect of nonstatus is that it is officially 
temporary, although in practice some types of nonstatus can last for 
a long time. 
Second, DED comes with few substantive or procedural rights.  
Substantively, its holders cannot vote,66 receive public benefits,67 
obtain driver’s licenses in some states,68 and are probably 
unprotected from some employment discrimination.69  Procedurally, 
there is not even any application process for DED status, let alone a 
formal hearing.70  DED does not prevent DHS from obtaining a 
removal order:  it only means that DHS will generally not enforce a 
removal order, although the limited guidance available on DED states 
that there are “exceptions” to nonenforcement of the removal order, 
including for persons “who have committed certain crimes, persons 
who are persecutors, and persons who have previously been 
deported, excluded or removed.”71  However, there does not seem to 
be any right to appeal a denial or revocation based on this vague 
                                                           
 64. Press Release, White House, Presidential Memorandum—Deferred Enforced 
Departure for Liberians (Sept. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, White House], 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/26/presidential-
memorandum-deferred-enforced-departure-liberians. 
 65. See id.  On November 21, 2014, DHS also designated Liberia for TPS until 
May 20, 2015 as a result of the Ebola outbreak in that county.  See Press Release, 
DHS DED, supra note 61 (citing the Ebola outbreak in West Africa as the reason 
for granting eighteen months TPS for eligible nationals of Liberia, Guinea, and 
Sierra Leone). 
 66. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (establishing a right to vote for citizens). 
 67. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613 (2012) (limiting receipt of most public benefits 
to “qualified aliens”); id. § 1641(b) (defining “qualified alien” so as to exclude 
persons with DED). 
 68. See infra note 286.  Federal law requires “lawful status” for purposes of getting 
a driver’s license and does not list DED as a lawful status.  See 6 C.F.R. § 37.1, 37.3 (2014). 
 69. All individuals in the United States are protected by the prohibition against 
race and national origin discrimination in employment contained in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, but they are not protected from discrimination based on 
immigration status.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)–(3) (prohibiting discrimination 
based on citizenship status for “[p]rotected individual[s]” and defining “[p]rotected 
individual” to exclude persons with non-status); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (prohibiting 
employers from discriminating, inter alia, based on national origin or race). 
 70. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 63, at 39. 
 71. Id. 
HEEREN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:55 PM 
2015] THE STATUS OF NONSTATUS 1131 
standard,72 and if the presidential administration in power 
discriminates as to how it allocates DED, there may not be a legal 
right to challenge it.73  Therefore, the second characteristic of 
nonstatus, is that it is tentative:  its holders have few rights and it is 
easily revocable. 
Third, the legal contours of DED are ambiguous.  DHS apparently 
relies on 8 U.S.C. § 1229a for legal support for this program, which is 
the provision of law conferring general immigration enforcement 
authority on the Attorney General (and the DHS Secretary), or 8 
U.S.C. § 1229c, which gives DOJ and DHS authority to grant 
“voluntary departure.”74  The provision neither explicitly mentions 
nor explains the requirements for DED.  Typically, the President 
designates DED via fiat through an executive order or presidential 
memorandum.75  Immigrants granted DED may apply for 
employment authorization, but that permission is the result of a 
regulation not a statute, making it subject to a greater possibility of 
change.76  Thus, another characteristic of nonstatus is that the legal 
authority for it is tenuous and sometimes even secret.  Whatever 
                                                           
 72. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) 
(explaining that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) allows judicial review of some of the Attorney 
General’s actions but not his decision to refuse reconsideration of an order); see also 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (declining to review the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA) decision not to respond to a prison inmate’s request 
that the FDA take enforcement action to prevent the use of drugs used to administer 
the death penalty); Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 
1519–20 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam) (refusing review of an agency 
decision declining to extend voluntary departure to Salvadorans). 
 73. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 472–73, 492 (declining to 
review a claim that individuals were being targeted for deportation based on their 
affiliation with a politically unpopular group). 
 74. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) (allowing the Attorney General to permit 
aliens to voluntarily leave the United States at their own expense as opposed to being 
subjected to removal proceedings as long as the alien leaves within 120 days, has 
been in the United States at least one year, has been an individual of good moral 
character for five years, has not committed a criminal offense invoking deportation 
proceedings, and has the means and intent to depart).  See generally SEGHETTI ET AL., 
supra note 61, at 2–3. 
 75. See AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 63, at 39 (explaining that 
because DED is not a statutory provision, the President can exercise his discretion to 
invoke it and can issue it on a country-by-country basis for serious issues in a country 
such as ongoing civil strife, environment disaster, or other extraordinary conditions). 
 76. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(a) (2014).  The U.S. Code defines an “unauthorized alien” 
ineligible to work as an alien who is not a LPR or otherwise granted permission by 
the Attorney General, seemingly conveying broad authority on the Executive Branch 
to decide who should get work permission.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3). 
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statute authorizes nonstatus will rarely provide a detailed framework; 
DHS will fill in requirements, if at all, using regulations or more 
commonly with non-binding policy guidance or memoranda. 
As mentioned above, individuals from DED-designated countries 
can obtain work permits.  To do so, DED recipients have to complete 
an “I-765 application” containing basic biographic data, such as an 
individual’s address, telephone number, and time and manner of 
entry.77  After submitting the application with a fee and photographs, 
DED recipients receive a notice for an appointment at an Application 
Support Center, where they are fingerprinted.78  The work permit 
DED recipients receive is valid for a limited time, and if they want to 
continue working, they must submit renewal applications containing 
updated information.79  Another characteristic of nonstatus, 
therefore, is that it offers the government a method of surveillance 
over the unauthorized population.  One could argue that nonstatus is 
essentially a registration program. 
Nonstatus is temporary, tenuous, and tentative.  It comes at the 
price of registration and government surveillance.  Yet, the ability to 
legally work, to get a driver’s license (for many types of nonstatus), to 
live without constant fear of deportation, and to simply have one’s 
presence recognized as legitimate is of enormous value to many 
people who would otherwise suffer a much more shadowy existence.  
Indeed, “coming out of the shadows” is how immigrant advocates and 
Dreamers often characterize obtaining nonstatus.  It is a way to claim 
some measure of dignity in a society that stigmatizes those without 
status as “illegals.”  In many cases, it is a brave act, too, because it 
sometimes involves substantial risk.  Although this Article catalogues 
the dangers and inadequacies of nonstatus, it is important to 
recognize that the individuals who have it deserve the respect that 
they have risked so much to achieve. 
Nonstatus should persuasively debunk the unenlightened notion 
that immigration is binary:  legal immigrants and illegal immigrants.  
Rather, immigration law affords a continuum of rights and 
privileges, and where one falls on this spectrum depends on many 
factors other than manner of entry.  The next Part will describe 
                                                           
 77. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., I-765, APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT 
AUTHORIZATION (Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/ 
files/files/form/i-765.pdf. 
 78. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-765, APPLICATION FOR 
EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 9 (Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/form/i-765instr.pdf. 
 79. DACA FAQ, supra note 20. 
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those who fall in the nebulous middle of this spectrum.  It will also 
trace the origins of modern-day nonstatus from the 1920s up to the 
contemporary DACA program. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONSTATUS 
Everybody’s got something to hide except for me and my monkey. 
- John Lennon80 
In 1971, John Lennon and Yoko Ono came to the United States to 
fight for custody of Yoko Ono’s daughter, Kyoko, by a prior 
marriage.81  After Yoko Ono won the custody battle, her ex-husband 
absconded with Kyoko.82  To try to find her, the couple overstayed their 
visas.83  The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) wasted little 
time in commencing expulsion proceedings against the controversial 
Lennon and Ono.84  Ostensibly, INS filed proceedings against 
Lennon because of his British cannabis conviction, although there is 
evidence that he was really targeted because of his political views.85 
To defend themselves, Lennon and Ono hired an intrepid 
immigration lawyer named Leon Wildes.86  Wildes pursued a 
sophisticated litigation strategy, including an effort to have Lennon 
selected for a program called “nonpriority status.”87  There was just 
one problem:  there was no proof that non-priority status existed.  
The Operations Instruction containing information about it “was 
buried in the Blue Sheets, the INS internal regulations [that were] 
                                                           
 80. THE BEATLES, Everybody’s Got Something to Hide Except for Me and My Monkey, on 
THE BEATLES (Apple Records 1968). 
 81. Leon Wildes, Not Just Any Immigration Case, CARDOZO L. REV. ALUMNI REV. 
(1998), http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/life/spring1998/john.lennon [hereinafter Wildes, 
Not Just Any Immigration Case]. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Goes Public:  The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 42, 44 (1977) [hereinafter Wildes, Nonpriority Program]. 
 84. Id. at 44–45. 
 85. See generally Wildes, Not Just Any Immigration Case, supra note 81 (indicating 
that Lennon was being selectively prosecuted by the Nixon Administration for 
political purposes on the ground that he was a “threat to the U.S. government and 
the reelection campaign of Richard Nixon because of [his] affiliations with members 
of the Radical Left”). 
 86. Id. (reporting that Wildes was comfortable pursuing a political strategy to 
persuade the government to approve Lennon and Yoko’s petitions to stay in the 
United States). 
 87. Id. at 53 (explaining that non-priority status was granted when there were 
humanitarian factors to consider after a deportation proceeding had begun). 
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never made available to the public.”88  According to Wildes, “[t]he 
situation was a classic example of a secret law.”89 
John Lennon spent five years fighting his deportation and 
eventually obtained a green card.90  Along the way, Wildes filed four 
separate federal lawsuits, Lennon recorded three albums, and 
Lennon and Ono announced at a press conference that they had 
founded the state of “Nutopia,” “a state with no borders, no laws, no 
exclusionary proceedings, no deportation proceedings, and no 
immigration lawyers!”91 
They also uncovered the existence of the non-priority program.  
Their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit confirmed that the 
rumored program existed and that the INS had granted non-priority 
status to a total of 1,843 individuals until 1974—mostly “the elderly, 
the young, the mentally incompetent, the infirm, and those who 
would be separated from their families.”92  In his effort to prevent 
Lennon’s deportation, Wildes had uncovered a program for granting 
nonstatus on a case-by-case basis to individuals with no other legal 
defense to deportation.  This program was one of many antecedents 
to the Obama Administration’s massive new deferred action 
programs.  The following subparts will consider the others. 
A. Parole 
DACA has offered mass relief to hundreds of thousands of 
individuals, but the non-priority status program was designed to 
provide relief on a case-by-case basis to discrete individuals with 
sympathetic cases.  There are, however, several older agency practices 
that sometimes mirror DACA and DAPA in that they have been 
categorically applied to large groups of individuals.  One of the most 
flexible practices—used at times both for entire categories of persons 
and for individuals—is parole. 
INS has used parole since at least the 1920s.93  INS appears to have 
originally invented parole out of whole cloth, but it gained a statutory 
                                                           
 88. Wildes, Nonpriority Program, supra note 83, at 43. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Wildes, Not Just Any Immigration Case, supra note 81. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Wildes, Nonpriority Program, supra note 83, at 53 (explaining that non-
priority status was granted through a formal, internal procedure initiated by an INS 
District Director and conducted without input from the alien himself, although an 
attorney could request non-priority status on behalf of his client). 
 93. See, e.g., In re R-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 45, 46 (BIA 1947) (“[T]he power to parole has 
been used to permit inadmissible aliens to adjust their immigration status where they 
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footing in 1952.94  The government does not consider parole to be an 
immigration “status,” and parolees have few rights.95  Courts have 
long accepted an “entry fiction” under which parolees are treated as 
though they have remained at the U.S. border even after they have 
lived in the country for years, acquired homes, and established 
families in the United States.96 
Originally, the government used parole on a case-by-case basis to 
allow individuals into the United States who had either failed to meet 
the legal requirements for entry or who had been denied legal entry 
and the corresponding set of rights because of INS discretion.97  
However, beginning in 1956, the government began to use parole for 
mass admissions of refugees.  That year, the government paroled in 
about 30,000 Hungarians fleeing the Soviet Union’s crackdown on 
the anti-communist revolution in Hungary.98  Over the following 
years, the government regularly used parole to allow refugees into 
the United States.99  One of the largest examples was during the 
Mariel Cuban boatlift, when the United States paroled in 
approximately 123,000 Cubans who had come based on President 
Carter’s statement that the United States would welcome them “with 
an open heart and open arms.”100  Ultimately, most obtained green 
cards under the Cuban Adjustment Act, but those who were deemed 
ineligible for adjustment due to criminal convictions or for other 
                                                           
entered without or with improper documents, to defend criminal prosecutions, to 
testify in criminal cases for the Government, to report for induction into the Armed 
Forces, to apply for registry and to apply for naturalization . . . [and] where the 
inadmissible alien has no right of appeal.”). 
 94. 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 31, § 62.01[1] (citing Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952)). 
 95. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (“The parole of aliens 
seeking admission . . . was never intended to affect an alien’s status . . . .”); In re 
Castellon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 616, 620 (BIA 1981) (noting that the scope of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ review over a Cuban parolee’s case was limited because 
applicants for admission do not enjoy the same constitutional rights that are afforded 
to aliens who have entered the United States). 
 96. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 229–31 (1925) (holding that a minor child 
had never entered the United States within the meaning of the law despite her nine-
year stay in the custody of an immigrant aid organization and her father). 
 97. 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 31, § 62.01 & n.3. 
 98. MOTOMURA, supra note 50, at 25. 
 99. 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 31, § 33.03[3]. 
 100. Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering:  The Detention of 
the Mariel Cubans Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations, 
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1733, 1735–36 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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reasons were subjected to prolonged detention.101  Many continue to 
live in the United States with parole or an even less secure form of 
nonstatus called supervision, which will be discussed in Part II.102 
Parole has most of the attributes of nonstatus:  it is a legal limbo 
that is officially not status at all, is entirely discretionary and comes 
with few rights, originally had no statutory basis, and remains legally 
nebulous although it now is mentioned in the INA.103  For many 
years, INS granted parole en mass to deal with humanitarian crises 
abroad or to advance the United States’s foreign policy interests, but 
in 1996, Congress amended the INA to allow parole “only on a case 
by case basis . . . .”104  As a result, the government has needed to find 
other ways to offer nonstatus to large groups of individuals. 
B. Voluntary Departure, Extended Voluntary Departure, and Deferred 
Enforced Departure 
Part I discussed deferred enforced departure, which has most 
recently been offered to Liberians in the United States.  The first 
Bush Administration invented DED in the late 1980s, but for nearly 
thirty years the INS had been granting a similar benefit with the 
equally contradictory name, extended voluntary departure.  The 
name alludes to a long-standing provision in the INA allowing 
immigration judges (IJs) or officers to grant “voluntary departure”105 
to deportable or excludable noncitizens in lieu of removal.106  
Although this provision seemed to contemplate short-term 
deportation reprieves and case-by-case adjudication, in 1960, the INS 
                                                           
 101. Id. at 1736; see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 375, 377 (2005) (explaining 
that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) provides that aliens who have been ordered for removal 
may remain in custody after the ninety-day removal period if the immigration judge 
found the alien inadmissible by reason of his prior criminal convictions, prior 
specific criminal offenses, lack of sufficient documentation, posing as a threat to 
national security, or if he has been determined by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to be a risk to the community, unlikely to comply with the order, or a flight risk). 
 102. See infra Part II.E. 
 103. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012) (permitting the Attorney General broad 
discretion in granting parole on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian reasons but 
requiring aliens to return to custody once the purpose of parole has elapsed). 
 104. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 602(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(A)–(D) (setting out the legal requirements for a 
noncitizen to obtain voluntary departure in lieu of an order of removal at the 
conclusion of removal proceedings). 
 106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1964).  In contrast to the earlier provision, the 
current one allows only for a maximum period of 120 days to voluntarily depart. 8 
U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
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began to use it to justify extended grants of nonstatus to all 
noncitizens from particular countries such as those in a state of strife, 
or countries that implicated United States foreign policy interests, 
like Cuba.107  As authority for EVD, the agency pointed to the 
voluntary departure provision or the more general INA section giving 
the Attorney General discretion to enforce immigration law as she 
or he sees fit.108 
EVD procedures were as vague as the statutory authority.  
Essentially, the Department of State would request that the Attorney 
General suspend deportation for a particular nationality.109  
Afterward, the INS would instruct field offices “not to enforce 
deportation and removal requirements for persons of a particular 
nationality group who arrived in the United States before a specified 
date.”110  Individuals who had “committed certain crimes” were not 
protected.111  There was no requirement that EVD recipients register, 
but they were required to apply for employment authorization.112 
                                                           
 107. The INS granted EVD to Cubans on November 29, 1960 and terminated it on 
November 2, 1966 when the Cuban Adjustment Act was passed.  See H.R. Rep. No. 
100-627, at 6 (1988).  From 1968–1977, the INS granted Czechoslovakians EVD in 
one-year increments.  Id.  Laotians, Vietnamese, and Cambodians received EVD for 
two years between 1975 and 1977, when Indochinese relief legislation providing for 
their adjustment of status was passed.  Id.  The INS gave EVD to Ethiopians from July 
12, 1977 until August 26, 1981, and EVD is still in effect for those who arrived before 
July 1, 1980.  Id.  From June 8, 1978 to September 30, 1986, the INS granted 
Ugandan nationals EVD.  Id.  Afghans have been allowed to remain in the United 
States since the 1980s.  Id.  Nicaraguans were given voluntary departure for fifteen 
months after the fall of the Somoza government.  Id.  Polish nationals who entered 
the United States prior to July 22, 1984 were given EVD through December 31, 1987.  
Id.; see Lynda J. Oswald, Note, Extended Voluntary Departure:  Limiting the Attorney 
General’s Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REV. 152, 158–59 n.40 (1986) 
(providing a chart of EVD grants up to 1986). 
 108. See Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 1510 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (finding that EVD falls under the Attorney General’s broad mandate in 8 
U.S.C. § 1103(a) to enforce immigration laws); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-627, at 7 
(1988) (describing this “safe haven” for persons of certain nationalities experiencing 
unexpected crisis in their country).  The Voluntary Departure provision was 
amended by IIRIRA to limit voluntary departure to 120 days, thereafter making 
that provision arguably unavailable as legal authority for EVD.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229c(a)(2)(A). 
 109. H.R. Rep. No. 100-627, at 7. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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The Reagan Administration disfavored EVD and believed that it 
was unnecessary in light of the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980.113  
Thus, after 1980, grants of EVD became less frequent, despite the fact 
that violent civil wars were disrupting Central America.114  Advocates 
and members of Congress criticized the Reagan Administration 
throughout the 1980s for failing to provide EVD to Salvadorans 
fleeing that country’s brutal twelve-year civil war.115 
The first Bush Administration was apparently more sympathetic to 
Chinese nationals after the Tiananmen Square crackdown than the 
Reagan Administration had been to Salvadorans.116  Afterward, it 
granted temporary protection to Chinese students in the United 
States.117  Perhaps because of the Administration’s prior opposition to 
EVD, it came up with a new name, “deferral of enforced departure,” 
for a status that in every other way resembled EVD.118  DED has now 
mostly replaced EVD, although ICE continues to grant something it 
calls EVD to a small number of individuals each year.119 
Not long afterward, the first Bush Administration granted a similar 
benefit to tens of thousands of undocumented spouses and children 
of formerly undocumented individuals who had been granted 
legalization through the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) of 1986.120  The new program, known as Family Fairness, 
required that applicants meet certain residency and other 
requirements, and, in exchange, they received one year of “voluntary 
                                                           
 113. See Suzanne Seltzer, Note, Temporary Protected Status:  A Good Foundation for 
Building, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 773, 786 (1992) (reporting that the Reagan 
Administration disfavored the “blanket relief” that EVD provides because the 
Refugee Act of 1980 established asylum for those at risk of persecution in their 
country of origin). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Oswald, supra note 107, at 153 & n.8, 161–62 & n.49. 
 116. John D. Griffin, Comment, The Chinese Student Protection Act and “Enhanced 
Consideration” for PRC Nationals:  Legitimizing Foreign Policy While Averting False Positives 
in Asylum Law, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (1995). 
 117. Id. at 1106. 
 118. More on Deferred Departure of PRC Nationals, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 676 
(June 26, 1989). 
 119. ICE granted EVD to 4,121 persons in FY 2010, 3,730 persons in FY 2011, 
3,398 persons in FY 2012, 3,014 individuals in FY 2013, and 2,806 individuals in FY 
2014. ICE FOIA Response, supra note 14. 
 120. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 312(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3435; Memorandum 
from Gene McNary, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to Reg’l 
Comm’rs 2 (Feb. 2, 1990) [hereinafter McNary Memorandum], available at 
http://cdn.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/2014/11/McNary-memo.pdf. 
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departure” and a work permit.121  The program replaced a more 
nebulous policy that had first been outlined in 1987 as a way to deal 
with situations in which only one member of a family had been 
granted legalization, raising the possibility that families could be torn 
apart by deportation.122 
Newspapers at the time reported dramatically different accounts 
concerning the number of individuals who would benefit from the 
change.123  It seems that about 50,000 individuals were probably 
granted voluntary departure under the program before the Family 
Unity program, later enacted by Congress, superseded it.124 
C. Family Unity and Temporary Protected Status 
The Immigration Act of 1990 created two legislative forms of 
nonstatus to replace EVD/DVD and Family Fairness.  Initially, 
Congress created the new “Family Unity” program to accomplish the 
same objective as the Family Fairness program:125  to provide relief to 
the undocumented spouse or child of a person granted relief under 
IRCA.  In time, INS promulgated regulations and created an 
                                                           
 121. See McNary Memorandum, supra note 120. 
 122. Id.  The earlier policy only allowed automatic voluntary departure for minor 
children living with newly legalized parents.  Id.  Ineligible spouses of legalized 
individuals had to show “compelling or humanitarian factors beyond the marriage 
itself to warrant voluntary departure.”  See INS Reverses Family Fairness Policy, 67 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 153 (Feb. 16, 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. Compare New Measure Opens the Door a Bit Wider to Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
1990, at 28 (reporting that thousands of illegal aliens who were the spouses or the 
children of legalized aliens would be allowed to stay in the United States as a result of 
this policy change), with Marvine Howe, New Policy Aids Families of Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 1990, at B3 (stating that as many as 1.5 million illegal immigrants benefitted 
from the Family Fairness policy, which allows close family members of legalized 
immigrants to remain in the country under certain conditions). 
 124. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 301, 104 Stat. 4978, 5029 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2012)) (creating the “Family Unity” 
program, which offers certain family members of individuals who are granted 
legalization work authorization and a temporary stay of deportation proceedings).  
According to a newspaper account published about a month before passage of the 
Immigration Act of 1990, “[i]n the eight months since McNary announced the family 
fairness program, INS received more than 250,000 inquiries about the program—but 
only 46,821 applications have been received nationwide.”  David Hancock, Few 
Immigrants Use Family Unity Program, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 1, 1990, at 1B. 
 125. Immigration Act of 1990 § 301; see 8 C.F.R. § 236.15 (1998) (stating that 
children of legalized aliens residing in the United States may be granted voluntary 
departure for two years and any alien granted benefits under the program is eligible 
for employment if he has applied for authorization through the I-765 form). 
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application form for Family Unity benefits.126  While the form 
remains available today, it is unlikely that many individuals apply for 
what is now one of the more esoteric benefits in immigration law 
because most eligible individuals have probably already adjusted 
status, been deported, or have left the United States. 
Subsequently, congressional disappointment with the Reagan 
Administration’s failure to protect Salvadorans led to the creation of 
temporary protected status, which Congress specifically mandated be 
offered to Salvadorans.127  After complying with the law and initially 
granting TPS to Salvadorans, the Bush Administration allowed TPS to 
lapse and instead granted them DED.128 
In subsequent years, Salvadorans have commonly received TPS, as 
have representatives of sixteen other nationalities.129  Some countries, 
like El Salvador and Liberia, have shifted between TPS and DED 
designations.  TPS is similar to the EVD and DED programs after 
which it was modeled, but is a bit more formal.  First, there is a 
specific standard for TPS set out in the statute.  DHS may designate 
the nationals of any foreign state as temporarily protected if it finds 
that the foreign state is experiencing civil strife, environmental 
disaster, or other extraordinary conditions and that requiring 
individuals to return to that foreign state would pose a serious threat 
to their safety.130  After designation, there is a formal application 
process for TPS—another distinction between TPS and EVD/DED.131  
                                                           
 126. 8 C.F.R. § 236.15.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., I-817 
APPLICATION FOR FAMILY UNITY BENEFITS (June 26, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/ 
default/files/files/form/i-817.pdf (constituting the application form, which seeks 
information about an applicant’s family member(s)). 
 127. Immigration Act of 1990 §§ 302(b)–303. 
 128. SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 61, at 4. 
 129. Salvadorans received TPS on and off throughout the provision’s history, 
including from 1990–1992, in 1998, in 2000, and from 2001–2015.  Id. at 3–4, 7; 
see Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-
departure/temporary-protected-status#Countries (last updated Jan. 7, 2015).  USCIS 
also currently grants TPS to Haitians, Hondurans, Nicaraguans, Somalians, 
Sudanese, South Sudanese, Syrians, and Liberians, Guineans, and Sierra Leoneans 
since 2011, 1999, 2001, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2014, respectively.  Id.  Past 
countries include “Kuwait from March 1991 to March 1992; Rwanda from June 1995 
to December 1997; Lebanon from March 1991 to March 1993; the Kosovo Province 
of Serbia from June 1998 to December 2000; Bosnia-Herzegovina from August 1992 
to February 2001; Angola from March 29, 2000, to March 29, 2003; and Burundi 
from November 4, 1997, to May 2, 2009.”  SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 61, at 3. 
 130. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 131. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., FORM I-821, APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 
PROTECTED STATUS (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/i-821. 
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Applicants must meet various requirements, including that they 
timely register for TPS and that they have continuously resided in the 
United States since the designation date for their country.132  Unlike 
DED and EVD, there are explicit and well-defined bars to TPS for 
individuals with particular types of convictions or other problematic 
immigration issues.133 
Like EVD, DED, and other forms of nonstatus, TPS is temporary 
and tenuous since the protection periods range from six to eighteen 
months, and DHS can decide afterward not to renew it.134  
Moreover, the TPS statute does not create any pathway to LPR status 
or citizenship.135  In fact, DHS has always taken the position that 
TPS does not constitute an “admission” for immigration purposes, 
meaning that TPS holders cannot easily adjust status even if they 
acquire some other route for doing so, such as by marrying an LPR 
or U.S. citizen.136 
TPS meets most of the characteristics for nonstatus, although it is a 
close call.  It is ostensibly temporary, but many Salvadorans now have 
held TPS for thirteen years.  It is tenuous and easy for the 
government to revoke or substitute for a less secure nonstatus, like 
DED.  TPS holders have few rights besides the right to work.  
However, unlike other forms of nonstatus, TPS’s contours are quite 
well described in a statute. 
TPS is one of the more populous categories of nonstatus.  In 2015, 
the Congressional Research Service identified a total of 320,300 TPS 
grants to nationals of El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Somalia, Southern Sudan, and Sudan.137  Since then, Syria, Liberia, 
Guinea, and Sierra Leone have been designated for TPS, allowing 
thousands more to receive the benefit. 
                                                           
 132. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 133. Id. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
 134. Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(B)–(C). 
 135. Id. § 1254a(f)(1). 
 136. See Serrano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (deferring to DHS’s position that TPS is not an “admission”).  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently rejected DHS’s position, so some TPS 
holders now have a pathway to a more secure status.  Flores v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., 718 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that the plain 
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1182, which lists classes of aliens ineligible for visas or 
admissions, makes no mention of TPS beneficiaries being categorically barred from 
visa or admission entry and that Congress intended TPS beneficiaries to be part of a 
protected class due to extraordinary circumstances). 
 137. SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 61, at 3.  The most populous group was the 
Salvadorans, with 204,000 TPS grants.  Id. 
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D. Withholding and Deferral of Removal 
In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act, which created a process 
for noncitizens who fear persecution based on certain protected 
grounds to seek refuge in the United States.138  The new asylum 
provisions in the INA set out a comprehensive legal standard and 
process for asylum, involving administrative interviews, immigration 
court hearings, and judicial review.139  Asylum is full status, allowing 
for LPR status after a year and offering a long-term pathway to 
citizenship.140  With passage of the Refugee Act, the United States 
could be said to be in substantial compliance with the international 
Refugee Convention and Protocol, to which the United States 
acceded in 1967.141 
During the twenty-nine years between the United States’s accession 
to the Refugee Protocol and the passage of the Refugee Act, its 
compliance with the Protocol was more ad hoc.  As discussed above, 
the United States admitted many refugees through parole and EVD.  
The INA also contained a provision that tracked one of the central 
principles of the Refugee Convention—non-refoulement—which 
prohibits a signatory from returning a refugee to a country “where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”142  Since 1951, the INA contained a similar such provision 
called “Withholding of Deportation.”143 
In sharp contrast to the asylum provision, the withholding statute 
provides little guidance on the legal standard or process for granting 
relief, or what benefits come with it.144  Yet over the past decades, the 
                                                           
 138. United States Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102. 
 139. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), -(d)(5)(A)(1). 
 140. Id. § 1159(b) (allowing for the adjustment of status of refugees and asylees 
present in the United States for a year). 
 141. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267–68. 
 142. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137, 176. 
 143. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) 
(2012)).  The provision is now entitled “Restriction on Removal” and is known 
colloquially as “withholding of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 144. The original provision read as follows:  “The Attorney General is authorized 
to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which 
in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period 
of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.”  8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1952).  It 
now reads:  “[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the 
Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that 
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INS and the courts have filled in the gaps with a fairly comprehensive 
framework of regulations and case law.145  Although the law for 
withholding may have started out vague, it is now relatively clear, 
meaning that it fails at least one of the criteria for nonstatus. 
However, it mostly meets the other characteristics:  it is temporary 
and tentative.  Originally, the provision authorized the Attorney 
General to grant withholding in her or his discretion, “for such 
period of time as he [the Attorney General] deems necessary.”  Now 
the provision is phrased in mandatory terms and requires a grant if 
the noncitizen can prove to an IJ that she meets the legal standard.  
However, DHS can reopen proceedings to try to terminate 
withholding of removal anytime conditions in the noncitizen’s 
country have improved or if new information shows that the 
noncitizen does not meet the eligibility requirements for withholding.146 
Withholding of removal under the INA is also tentative because it 
comes without many rights.  Like other forms of nonstatus, 
withholding grantees can work, but they cannot travel, seek LPR 
status or citizenship, petition for family members to obtain 
immigration status, or apply for most public benefits.147  Thus, 
withholding of removal under the INA is like nonstatus, although it 
fails to satisfy one part of the definition in that the method for 
obtaining it is clear. 
In addition to withholding of removal under the INA, there is 
another benefit under U.S. law that is similar to asylum but comes 
without the status and rights that accompany asylum.  In 1984, the 
United Nations adopted the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and 
CAT entered into force in the United States in 1994.148  Among other 
things, CAT prohibits signatories from sending individuals to 
countries where they are likely to be tortured.149 
                                                           
country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). 
 145. See 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 31, § 34.03[2] (explaining the development 
of procedures for adjudicating withholding of removal cases). 
 146. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(f) (2014). 
 147. DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION:  LAW AND POLICY 92 (2d ed. 2007). 
 148. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter 
Convention Against Torture]; see In re H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 257 (BIA 1998) 
(dismissing a defendant’s motion for appeal after he was found to be deportable for 
committing a felony because the Board rejected the argument that his deportation 
violated Article 3 of the CAT, which prohibits the return of an individual to a country 
when there are substantial grounds to believe he would be subject to torture). 
 149. Convention Against Torture, supra note 148, at 114. 
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In 1998, Congress incorporated CAT into U.S. law through the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA).150  
FARRA required the Department of Justice (DOJ) to promulgate 
regulations that, to the maximum extent possible, exclude from 
protection those noncitizens who are ineligible for withholding of 
removal under the INA because they are security risks, are subject to 
the persecutor bar, or have been convicted of particularly serious 
crimes.151  DOJ promulgated regulations in 1999.152  Its way of 
complying with Congress’s exclusionary mandate was to set up a 
process by which an individual can be granted either CAT 
“withholding of removal” or CAT “deferral of removal.”153 
Under the regulations, individuals are excluded from CAT 
withholding of removal for essentially the same reasons that they are 
from excluded from withholding of removal under the INA.154  In 
contrast, CAT deferral of removal is available to everyone, regardless 
of whether an applicant would be inadmissible for past criminal or 
terrorist activity.155  However, life is not easy for a CAT deferral of 
removal grantee.  DHS has historically taken the position that such 
individuals can be held in detention indefinitely while it pursues 
efforts to deport them to another country or while it seeks 
“diplomatic assurances” from the individual’s country of origin that it 
will not torture the person.156  As a matter of constitutional due 
process, the government must eventually release CAT grantees if 
there is no reasonably foreseeable possibility of deportation, but most 
CAT deferral of removal grantees sit in detention for at least three to 
six months before they are released.157  When ICE does not release a 
person within that time frame, his or her only remedy is to file a 
                                                           
 150. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012)). 
 151. Id. § 2242(c). 
 152. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 
8678 (Feb. 19, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240, 241, 253, 507). 
 153. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2014) (explaining CAT withholding of removal); id.     
§ 208.17 (explaining CAT deferral of removal). 
 154. Id. § 208.16(d)(2). 
 155. Id. § 208.17(a). 
 156. See Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the 
U.S. government could utilize diplomatic channels to purportedly confirm that a 
Pakistani national who met the INA’s extremely broad terrorism provision would not 
be tortured if he were deported to Pakistan). 
 157. Id. at 742; 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4)(C)(1) (providing for custody reviews after 
the conclusion of a 90-day removal period and again within three months thereafter). 
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complex and time-consuming habeas petition—a project for which 
most detainees lack the resources.158 
Like withholding of removal under the INA, CAT deferral and 
withholding meet some of the characteristics of nonstatus.  Although 
FARRA provides a statutory basis for CAT, the framework for CAT 
adjudication is set out in the regulations.  Those regulations offer a 
fairly robust framework for IJs to assess CAT claims.159  However, 
there is no question that CAT is tentative and ostensibly temporary.  
In fact, DHS is more aggressive about enforcing the supposedly 
temporary quality of CAT than it is for INA withholding.  Specifically, 
DHS is more likely to hold CAT grantees in detention for longer 
periods while it tries to find other places to send individuals with CAT 
or while it pursues efforts to obtain diplomatic assurances from the 
individual’s country of origin that it will not in fact torture the CAT 
grantee.  DHS stubbornly goes through the motions of searching for 
an alternative country of removal in almost every CAT case.  Such 
individuals are typically released under an ICE “order of supervision,” an 
overlapping form of nonstatus that will be addressed in the next subpart. 
There are thousands of individuals living in the United States today 
with the nonstatus of withholding or deferral of removal.  From 2000 
to 2014, DOJ and DHS granted CAT deferral of removal to 
approximately 1,736 individuals and CAT withholding to 
approximately 6,305 individuals.160  Statistics for INA withholding for 
2000–2001 are missing or unreliable, but over the twelve-year period 
from 2002–2014, DOJ granted INA withholding of removal to 
approximately 22,929 individuals.161 
                                                           
 158. E.g., Reid v. Donelan, 991 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281 (D. Mass. 2014). 
 159. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18. 
 160. These numbers were compiled by adding yearly statistics from the U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK for the 
years 2002–2014.  Statistical Yearbooks, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
statspub/syb2000main.htm (last updated Mar. 2015). 
 161. See id.  EOIR often reports several years’ worth of withholding statistics in the 
same table, and it often appears to revise prior years’ statistics in subsequent 
yearbooks.  Therefore, statistics were taken from the most recent yearbook that 
stated data for that year.  2002 data came from the 2006 yearbook.  2003 data came 
from the 2007 yearbook.  2004 data came from the 2008 yearbook.  Years 2005–2009 
were all supplied by the 2009 Yearbook. 2010-2014 data was taken from the 2014 
Yearbook.  Data for 2000 was not reported in any yearbook.  Data for 2001, reported 
in the 2005 yearbook, was disregarded as unreliable because the 2056 reported 
grants seemed unusually high, and the statistics reported for subsequent years in that 
yearbook were radically higher than the numbers reported in following years’ 
yearbooks for those years. 
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Table 1:  Grants of Withholding, CAT Withholding, and CAT Deferral for the 
Years 2002–2014 
 
Year Withholding CAT Withholding CAT Deferral 
2000  316 213 
2001  443 101 
2002 902  483 75 
2003 1357 427 63 
2004 1764 430 105 
2005 2106 388 70 
2006 2569 405 173 
2007 2550 449 92 
2008 2019 378 123 
2009 1959 394 110 
2010 1496 395 94 
2011 1673 493 136 
2012 1553 514 129 
2013 1518 375 131 
2014 1463 415 121 
TOTAL 22,929 6305 1736 
E. ICE Supervision and Stays of Removal 
ICE has ninety days to remove a person with a removal order,162 
and if it fails to do so within this time frame it is supposed to 
undertake a “post-order custody review” to decide whether removal 
in the near future is likely or if the person should continue to be 
detained as a security risk.163  Many individuals end up being 
released at this stage with an ICE “order of supervision.”164  A person 
with an order of supervision must periodically report to ICE, has no 
pathway to LPR status or citizenship, and cannot travel but might be 
allowed to work.165 
ICE also gives orders of supervision to deportable individuals it 
apprehends who are subject to a variety of forms of summary 
                                                           
 162. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) (2012). 
 163. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(h). 
 164. Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 
45 (2010); Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation:  The Right to Appointed 
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 63, 129 n.108 (2012). 
 165. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18) (providing that employment authorization is 
awarded at the discretion of the district director); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, FORM I-220B, ORDER OF SUPERVISION (2012) [hereinafter ICE, FORM 
I-220B] (on file with author) (restricting travel and requiring regular reporting to 
the ICE office). 
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removal, including persons subject to expedited removal or 
reinstatement of prior removal orders.166  Sometimes ICE will also 
decide to “stay the removal” of a person with a removal order in 
response to either a formal request for a stay filed by an attorney167 
or as an exercise of its own discretion.  In fiscal year 2013, it granted 
stays of removal to 10,584 individuals; in 2014 it granted stays of 
removal to 13,611 individuals.168  ICE typically gives these individuals 
orders of supervision too, sometimes in conjunction with a decision 
to stay the removal for a particular period of time or indefinitely.169 
An order of supervision is a multiple page document that spells 
out certain conditions of release and restrictions on the liberty of 
the supervisee.  These conditions include prohibiting travel 
outside the jurisdiction of the local ICE office without permission, 
requiring that the individual appear for medical or psychiatric 
examinations at the request of ICE, and testifying under oath 
concerning any subject ICE wishes.170  The document typically also 
contains a schedule for check-ins with the local ICE office.171  
Initially, the check-ins might be every few months, but over time 
ICE might revise the check-in schedule so that the individual 
needs to report in only once or twice a year.172  Check-ins are 
sometimes pro forma, but there is always the possibility that a 
person will be re-detained by ICE at the check-in.173  Some 
                                                           
 166. See Memorandum from Victor X. Cerda, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, to Field Office Dirs. 1–2 (Nov. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Cerda 
Memorandum] (reiterating that field offices should continue to release individuals 
who qualify for orders of supervision and comply with the policy guidelines outlined 
in the memorandum); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the 
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6–9, 24 (2014) (describing various 
procedural mechanisms for “speed deportation” and noting that ICE has prosecutorial 
discretion to issue supervision orders in lieu of enforcing an order of removal). 
 167. U.S. CUSTOMS & IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT, APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF 
DEPORTATION OR REMOVAL (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/Document/2014/ice_form_i_246.pdf. 
 168. ICE FOIA Response, supra note 14. 
 169. See 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(3) (2012) (noting that supervision regulations are 
prescribed by the Attorney General). 
 170. ICE, FORM I-220B, supra note 165. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Cerda Memorandum, supra note 166, at 1–2 (providing supervision 
reporting guidelines but acknowledging that alternative requirements may be 
established based upon the needs of specific circumstances). 
 173. See Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1114 (D. Or. 2006) (“ICE . . . 
can return aliens to detention or seek criminal penalties against aliens who violate 
their orders of supervision.”); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4) (2014) (providing authority for 
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individuals released on an order of supervision are also required 
to wear an electronic bracelet that allows ICE to constantly 
monitor the person’s whereabouts.174  The devices cannot be 
removed, which makes simple things like getting dressed and 
showering difficult. 
Supervision is essentially a kind of indefinite immigration 
probation involving surveillance, paternalistic hectoring, and the 
constant threat of deportation.  There is a statutory basis for 
supervision, but it is awarded at the sole discretion of ICE officers, 
and supervision determinations are not appealable.175  It is 
officially temporary but can last indefinitely.  Individuals with 
supervision can seek work permission if they can prove that they 
need it, but their travel even inside the United States is restricted, 
and if they leave the country, they will probably never be able to 
come back.176 
As reflected in the graph below, every year, ICE appears to grant 
supervision to more and more individuals.  In fiscal year 2010, ICE 
granted supervision orders to 47,078 individuals; in 2014 it 
granted supervision to 81,085 individuals.177  The growth of ICE 
supervision is consistent with the growth of other types of 
nonstatus throughout this same time period.  At present, ICE 
reports that there are 613,578 individuals with ICE orders of 
supervision, making supervision one of the largest and fastest 
growing forms of nonstatus.178 
                                                           
DHS to re-detain a person if it determines that changed conditions have created a 
reasonably foreseeable possibility of deportation). 
 174. ICE, FORM I-220B, supra note 165. 
 175. The statutory basis for supervision is section 241 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, which requires DHS to promulgate regulations for the supervision of 
noncitizens ordered removed whom DHS has been unable to remove within a ninety-
day removal period.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2012). 
 176. DHS’s regulations allow for a work permit to be granted to a person on 
supervision.  See 8 C.F.R. § 274a(12)(c)(18).  Travel under an order of supervision is 
typically explicitly restricted by the terms of the order. ICE, FORM I-220B, supra note 165. 
 177. ICE FOIA Response, supra note 14. 
 178. Id. 
HEEREN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:55 PM 
2015] THE STATUS OF NONSTATUS 1149 
Figure 1:  ICE Supervision Grants 2010–2014 
 
F. Deferred Action, Part I 
In 2014, deferred action has gone from an obscure nonstatus to 
the center of the national debate as a result of President Obama’s 
controversial immigration executive actions that expanded access to 
DACA and created DAPA.  Some scholars have contended that 
President Obama’s creation of a categorical process for conferring 
deferred action on thousands of persons has no precedent.179  In fact, 
deferred action has been offered on both a case-by-case and 
categorical basis over the past few decades.  This subpart describes 
the many types of deferred action and the gradual evolution of this 
form of nonstatus from an esoteric benefit offered on a case-by-case 
basis to a categorical one offered on a large scale to thousands of 
                                                           
 179. See Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law:  Presidential 
Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
105, 119 (2014); see also Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion:  
Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law 18, 26 (Roger Williams 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Paper No. 156, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2559836&download=yes (indicating that “Congress has never 
authorized or acquiesced in a blanket award of benefits to foreign nationals with no 
prospect for obtaining legal status in a reasonable time,” contending that deferred 
action has until now been limited to the Family Fairness program, which was 
ancillary to a statutory benefit, and to “a relatively small number of hardship cases”).  
This section of the Article disputes this contention by documenting the increase in 
categorical grants of deferred action beginning in the late 1990s. 
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eligible individuals.  Viewed in this context, DACA and DAPA are not 
radical departures but, rather, the culmination of a growing trend. 
1. Deferred action in the wake of the non-priority program 
As a result of John Lennon’s FOIA battle, the INS released its 
previously secret Operating Instructions concerning non-priority 
status, which it retitled “deferred action.”180  The Operating 
Instructions reveals non-priority status and deferred action to have 
been an early example of nonstatus.  First, deferred action was a 
temporary deferral of deportation, subject to periodic internal 
review.181  Second, it came without a clear package of rights; the only 
evidence of the status was a notification from INS to the beneficiary 
“that no action will be taken by the [agency] to disturb his 
immigration status, or that his departure from the United States has 
been deferred indefinitely, whichever is appropriate.”182  Third, there 
was no statutory authority for deferred action other than the absence 
of anything in the INA prohibiting it.183 
The INS then and DHS now have considered deferred action to be 
an unreviewable exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.184  However, 
the immigration agency’s discretion was not unfettered:  the 
Operating Instructions set out a list of factors that the agency was 
required to consider in deciding whether or not to grant deferred 
action, and there were multiple levels of internal review.185  Initially, 
the U.S. courts of appeals split on whether federal courts could 
review deferred action decisions.186  In response to the circuit split, 
                                                           
 180. See Wildes, Nonpriority Program, supra note 83, at 43–46 (detailing John 
Lennon’s Freedom of Information Act battle); see also Leon Wildes, The Operations 
Instructions of the Immigration Service:  Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 99, 102–06 (1979) [hereinafter Wildes, Operations Instructions] (discussing federal 
courts of appeals’ use of the non-priority Operations Instruction during the 1970s). 
 181. Wildes, Nonpriority Program, supra note 83, at 50 n.32. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 49. 
 184. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David 
V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement 1, 3 (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Napolitano Memorandum], 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion- 
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (stating the deferred action policy is an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and, therefore, unreviewable). 
 185. Wildes, Nonpriority Program, supra note 83, at 50 n.32. 
 186. Compare Nichols v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding “that the 
decision of an INS District Director upon an application for non-priority status will 
stand unless it so departs from an established pattern of treatment of others similarly 
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the INS amended its Operating Instructions to clarify that deferred 
action was “in no way an entitlement.”187 
In 1996, Congress undertook a major reform of the immigration 
laws, two principal aspects of which were to restrict the ability of IJs to 
grant discretionary relief from removal and the ability of federal 
courts to review agency decisions.188  Not long afterward, the INS 
rescinded the Operating Instructions for deferred action as part of a 
“housekeeping” effort.189  However, around the same time, INS 
Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a memo on prosecutorial 
discretion that reaffirmed the existence of deferred action as well as 
the INS’s general authority to prioritize deporting some noncitizens 
over others.190 
Thus, advocates continued to seek deferred action for their 
clients.191  Given Congress’s elimination of most judicial relief from 
removal in 1996,192 prosecutorial discretion would seem to have 
become an even more important advocacy tool and perhaps also a 
safety valve for an agency overburdened by its enforcement 
obligations.  Professors Adam Cox and Christina Rodríguez have 
                                                           
situated without reason, as to be arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion”), with Soon Bok Yoon v. INS, 538 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam) (finding that deferred action decisions are within the sole discretion of the INS). 
 187. Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services:  A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 819, 822 (2004) [hereinafter Wildes, Deferred Action Program]. 
 188. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:  
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1624 (2000) (explaining that 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214, eliminated jurisdiction to review removal orders “predicated on criminal 
convictions,” “discretionary remedies in compassionate circumstances,” and removal 
orders entered pursuant to an “expedited removal process” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation 
Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1952 (2000) 
(describing how the 1996 statute prohibited IJs from taking family integrity into 
consideration when a child adopted from Thailand was deported after turning 
eighteen because the family had not filed the proper paperwork). 
 189. Wadhia, supra note 10, at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 190. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, Reg’l & Dist. 
Counsel 2–6, 12 (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Meissner Memorandum] (explaining 
that investigations focused on identifying high priority aliens are preferable to 
investigations that identify a broader variety of removable aliens). 
 191. Id. at 12. 
 192. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
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argued that the 1996 immigration reforms acted to increase the 
government’s discretion over removal by shifting discretion from 
judges to ICE officers whose charging decisions were unreviewable.193  
To date, however, commentators have assumed that this authority was 
exercised during the period after the 1996 reforms on a case-by-case 
basis.194  A closer look reveals that in the years following the 1996 
reforms, the INS began to expand its use of deferred action to offer it 
to entire categories of individuals.  Like the other types of nonstatus 
discussed above, deferred action became a vehicle for massive grants 
of relief to entire categories of unauthorized immigrants.195 
2. VAWA deferred action 
The first categorical application of deferred action was for certain 
abused spouses and children of LPRs and U.S. citizens.  In 1994, 
Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which 
included a new immigration benefit.196  As described in Part I, a 
petition filed by a U.S.-citizen family member, such as a spouse, 
provides one means to obtain LPR status in the United States.  
Congress found that many abusive spouses were using this power to 
control their unauthorized partner.197  Thus, VAWA created a process 
for abused spouses and children to file “self petitions.”198  If the 
petition met certain requirements, including a showing that the 
                                                           
 193. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 16, at 517–19 (arguing that the Executive 
Branch’s authority has increased because discretionary relief is no longer guided by 
the INA’s statutory framework and instead is consolidated in the hands of agency 
officials responsible for charging decisions). 
 194. See id. at 517 (“[T]he Executive still has de facto delegated authority to grant 
relief from removal on a case-by-case basis [using prosecutorial discretion].”); see also 
Margulies, supra note 179, at 119 (“Immigration authorities have historically decided 
on deferred action ‘on a case-by-case basis.’” (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 n.8 (1999))). 
 195. In addition to the growth of categorical deferred action described in this 
subpart, ICE continues to also grant deferred action on a case-by-case basis to many 
individuals each year.  In FY 2013, ICE granted deferred action to 6,392 individuals; 
in FY 2014, it granted deferred action to 9,705 individuals.  ICE FOIA Response, 
supra note 14. 
 196. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796. 
 197. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993) (suggesting that battered spouses 
are unlikely to report to authorities that they have been abused because they fear 
being deported). 
 198. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(v) (2012). 
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petitioner had suffered “battery or extreme cruelty,” it would be 
approved, thus allowing the petitioner to then seek LPR status.199 
After passage of VAWA, the INS had to work through a number of 
implementation issues.  One important issue was what to do with 
VAWA self-petitioners during the interim period between approval of 
their petitions and when they adjusted status to obtain green cards.  
The abused spouses and children of U.S. citizens could adjust status 
immediately after the approval of their self-petitions because they 
were classified as “immediate relatives,” a category that is not subject 
to annual caps on the number of visas.200  However, those individuals 
filing petitions based on their relationship to an LPR were subject to 
the annual caps.201  As discussed in Part I, there are lengthy wait times 
for most immigration categories depending on the nature of the 
relationship and the applicant’s country of origin.  This means that 
many VAWA petitioners would have to wait years before they could 
adjust status.  The INS had to decide what to do with all these individuals 
with approved petitions.  What was their status?  Could they work? 
Initially, the INS suggested that VAWA self-petitioners seek either 
voluntary departure or deferred action on a case-by-case basis and 
then seek work permission based on their receipt of those benefits.202  
However, by the end of 1999, the INS began to grant deferred action 
routinely to all VAWA self-petitioners residing in the United States 
with approved petitions who had not yet adjusted status and who were 
not in removal proceedings.203  The INS acknowledged in its 
memorandum setting out this procedure that many VAWA self-
petitioners were likely to remain in deferred action for ten years or 
longer while they waited for a visa to become available.204 
                                                           
 199. To be approved, a VAWA petition must document the existence of a 
relationship to a U.S. citizen or LPR, that the petitioner has resided in the 
United States with her spouse or parent, that she has suffered “battery or 
extreme cruelty” by her spouse or parent, and that she has good moral character.  
Id. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(vi), -(B)(ii)–(iii).  For petitioners seeking classification 
based on marriage, the petition must also establish that the marriage was entered 
into in good faith.  See id. 
 200. Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 201. Id. § 1151(c). 
 202. Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or 
as a Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses 
and Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061, 13,071–02 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pts. 103, 204–205, 216). 
 203. Memorandum from Michael D. Cronin, Acting Assoc. Comm’r, Office of 
Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Reg’l Dirs. 2 (Dec. 22, 1998). 
 204. Id. at 4. 
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At first, the INS would not extend deferred action for more than 
twenty-seven months beyond the date in which a visa became 
available.205  However, the INS soon realized that many VAWA self-
petitioners were ineligible to adjust status because of past 
immigration infractions or other issues.206  As a result, the INS 
eliminated the cap, allowing VAWA self-petitioners to remain in 
deferred action indefinitely.207 
From 2000 to 2011, the INS and its successor, USCIS, approved 
over 67,000 VAWA self-petitions, likely granting deferred action to 
most of them.208  It is difficult to say exactly how many of these self-
petitioners have remained in deferred action instead of adjusting 
status, but it is likely that a relatively substantial number of them 
remained in deferred action given the strictness of certain provisions 
enacted as part of the 1996 immigration reforms.  For example, one 
provision permanently bars individuals from being admitted to the 
United States as LPRs if they accrued one year or more of unlawful 
presence in the United States, left the United States, and later 
reentered the country.209  As a result of this and other restrictions, 
many VAWA self-petitioners will remain indefinitely in the nonstatus 
of deferred action. 
3. Deferred action and U Visas 
During the same period, USCIS also granted deferred action to 
thousands of immigrants who are victims of crimes.  In 2000, 
Congress created the U visa, a visa for immigrant victims of certain 
                                                           
 205. See Memorandum from Michael D. Cronin, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm’r, 
Office of Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Vt. Serv. Ctr. 1 (Sep. 8, 2000).  The 
twenty-seven month cap was for self-petitioners “for whom a visa number was 
immediately available.”  Id.  There was a cap of twenty-four months after the date on 
which a visa became available for all other self-petitioners.  Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42477, IMMIGRATION PROVISIONS 
OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA) 4–5 tbl.1 (2012), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42477.pdf. 
 209. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C) (2012).  There are many other strict grounds of 
inadmissibility that prevent VAWA self-petitioners and others from adjusting status.  
One provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), makes persons inadmissible who have 
made false claims to citizenship, which is common for those who have provided false 
documentation in order to work. Id. §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  Another common 
provision makes any person inadmissible “who at any time knowingly has 
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to 
enter the United States . . . .”  Id. § 1182(a)(6)(E).  This applies on its face to persons 
who have helped family members to illegally enter the United States. 
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crimes who are assisting or who have assisted law enforcement 
investigations.210  For some reason, it took the INS and DHS an 
unusually long time—seven years—to promulgate regulations to 
implement the new U visa provision.211  During the interim, the 
immigration agency granted deferred action to 7,500 U visa 
applicants.212  Although most of the applicants were likely ultimately 
granted U visas, the interim grants are another example of the 
growth of categorical deferred action.213 
Recently, USCIS has again begun granting deferred action to large 
numbers of U visa applicants.  The number of annual U visa 
applicants now vastly exceeds the 10,000 U visas allotted by statute for 
each year.214  After reaching the annual cap, USCIS now conditionally 
grants a U visa to eligible applicants and grants them deferred action 
in the interim, later substituting a U visa for the deferred action once 
more visas become available.215 
                                                           
 210. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1533–34 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)) (creating a new nonimmigrant visa classification to encourage law 
enforcement “to better serve immigrant crime victims and to prosecute crimes 
committed against aliens”). 
 211. See generally Jessica Farb, The U Visa Unveiled:  Immigrant Crime Victims Freed from 
Limbo, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26, 26–27 (2007) (examining how the seven-year delay and 
failure to promulgate proper regulations forced immigrant advocates to turn to 
litigation to expose problems and create pressure for a solution). 
 212. See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigrations Servs., to Dir., Vt. Serv. Ctr. 1–2 (Oct. 8, 2003) 
(outlining interim relief for U nonimmigrant status by centralizing the process at 
the Vermont Service Center where requests receive case-by-case scrutiny to 
determine if deferred action is appropriate); Farb, supra note 211, at 27 (providing 
an overview of the confusion to families, advocates, and law enforcement resulting 
from the deferred applications). 
 213. In 2008, Congress amended the deportation grounds of the INA to state that 
U visa applicants with a final removal order can seek a stay of removal. William 
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110–457, § 204, 122 Stat. 5044.  It also clarified that “[t]he denial of a request for an 
administrative stay of removal under this subsection shall not preclude the alien from 
applying for a stay of removal, deferred action, or a continuance or abeyance of 
removal proceedings under any other provision of the immigration laws of the 
United States.”  Id.  This reference to “deferred action” could signal congressional 
acquiescence to the Executive Branch’s practice of granting the benefit. 
 214. ASISTA, U CAP UPDATE FROM USCIS & ADDITIONAL UPDATES FROM VSC 
STAKEHOLDER TELECONFERENCE 1 (Dec. 11, 2013) (on file with author). 
 215. Id. 
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4. Deferred action after Hurricane Katrina 
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused many academic institutions to 
shut down, making it impossible for foreign students to meet a 
primary condition of their visas—namely, that they be actively 
engaged in study.  As a result, USCIS granted deferred action to 
about 5,500 foreign students.216 
5. Deferred action for widows and widowers 
The next group to receive deferred action was spouses of deceased 
U.S. citizens who had been married for less than two years before the 
death of their spouses.  USCIS had interpreted the INA to require it 
to deny spousal visa petitions filed by U.S. citizens who had been 
married for less than two years and who died before USCIS could 
adjudicate their petitions.217  Several U.S. courts of appeals split over 
whether USCIS’s interpretation was correct, meaning that surviving 
spouses were treated differently in different parts of the country.218  
In 2009, USCIS attempted to ameliorate the problem by offering 
deferred action to surviving spouses living in the circuits where they 
could not adjust status.219  However, the benefit was short-lived 
because Congress amended the INA at the end of 2009 to eliminate 
the requirement that the surviving spouse of a U.S. citizen be married 
for two years prior to the death of the U.S. citizen in order to self-
petition for LPR status.220 
                                                           
 216. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the Dream 
Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 59, 67 (2013). 
 217. See Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 255, 263 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that a surviving alien-spouse whose citizen-spouse filed a Form I-130 prior to his or 
her death qualifies as a ‘spouse’ under the ‘‘immediate relative’’ provision of the INA). 
 218. Compare Robinson v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358, 367 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(upholding USCIS’s interpretation that a surviving alien spouse who was not married 
to his or her deceased citizen-spouse for two years does not qualify as an immediate 
relative under the INA), with Lockhart, 573 F.3d at 255 (rejecting USCIS’s 
interpretation and finding that Congress intended for an alien widow to qualify as an 
immediate relative even though the widow’s citizen spouse died within two years of 
the marriage), Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2009) (same), and 
Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). 
 219. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Establishes Interim Relief 
for Widows of U.S. Citizens (June 9, 2009), available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2009/06/09/dhs-establishes-interim-relief-widows-us-citizens. 
 220. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-83, § 568(c), 123 Stat 2142, 2186 (2009). 
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6. Deferred action for military family members 
In 2010, DHS announced a deferred action program that would 
apply to military families.  DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano 
responded to an inquiry from U.S. Representative Zoe Lofgren about 
“the immigration needs of soldiers and their families” by noting that 
“a new DHS policy” promoted the use of “several discretionary 
authorities,” including deferred action, “to minimize periods of 
family separation” for “immigrants who are the spouses, parents and 
children of military members.”221  As a result, immigrants who lacked 
status but were related to a military member could reap the benefits 
of deferred action. 
G. Administrative Closure 
In June 2011, ICE Director John Morton issued a memo reiterating 
the agency’s intention to focus its prosecutorial resources on high 
priority cases.222  Commonly known as the Morton Memo, the memo 
established various ways ICE could exercise prosecutorial discretion, 
such as by not filing a case, agreeing to close a case, conceding to 
relief, or not pursuing an appeal.223  The memo emphasized that ICE 
would exercise its discretion to not pursue removal cases against 
lower priority cases, such as those involving veterans, long-time LPRs, 
minors and the elderly, individuals present in the United States since 
childhood, pregnant or nursing women, crime victims, the mentally 
ill, and individuals with serious health conditions.224  Furthermore, 
the memo set out a series of factors for ICE officials to consider in 
deciding whether or not to favorably exercise prosecutorial discretion.225 
Not long afterward, the Obama Administration announced that it 
would be “reviewing the current deportation caseload to clear out 
low-priority cases on a case-by-case basis and make more room to 
deport people who have been convicted of crimes or pose a security 
                                                           
 221. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to Zoe Lofgren, 
Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 30, 2010) (on file with author). 
 222. See June 2011 Morton Memo, supra note 8, at 4–5. The June 2011 Morton 
memo built on the Meissner Memorandum, supra note 190, at 6, as well as a series 
of other memos the agency issued over the years.  June 2011 Morton Memo, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
 223. June 2011 Morton Memo, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
 224. Id. at 5. 
 225. Id. at 4. 
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risk.”226  Over the following months, immigration court hearings were 
rescheduled to make time for ICE trial attorneys to review their 
entire dockets for cases that met ICE’s guidelines for case closure.227  
Although the initial docket review has concluded, attorneys who have 
clients with sympathetic cases continue to make a “PD request” to the 
local office of the ICE Chief Counsel.228 
As a result of the Morton Memo, about 29,000 removal cases have 
been administratively closed.229  However, there seem to be wide 
disparities in the rates at which different offices are closing cases.  For 
example, nearly one-third of the cases closed in the Seattle Immigration 
Court were closed due to ICE recommending closure as an exercise 
of its prosecutorial discretion, while only 1.7 percent of the cases 
closed in Houston were closed due to prosecutorial discretion.230 
When a case is administratively closed, it is removed from the 
court’s calendar but not from its docket.231  It remains indefinitely 
pending in inactive status.232  As a result, noncitizens with 
administratively closed cases technically remain in removal 
proceedings, although as long as the case is closed, there is no 
possibility that they will be removed.  Many of these individuals will 
have filed applications for relief from removal, and these 
applications will remain pending, too, without ever being 
adjudicated.233  Because some applications come with a right to seek 
work permission while the application is pending, many individuals 
                                                           
 226. Cecilia Muñoz, Immigration Update:  Maximizing Public Safety and Better Focusing 
Resources, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 
2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizing-public-safety-and-better-focusing-resources. 
 227. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N COL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION REVIEW PILOT PROGRAM IN DENVER, COLORADO 6–7 (2011), available at 
http://www.aila.org/infonet/co-chapter-practice-advisory-implement-pd-denver. 
 228. Id. at 4–5. 
 229. TRAC, supra note 7, at tbl.2. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 692, 695 (BIA 2012) (discussing how 
administrative closure is a tool to temporarily remove a case from an IJ’s active 
calendar or from the Board’s docket and acknowledging that administrative closures 
are not final orders because the appeal may be reinstated by the Board or 
recalendared by DHS). 
 232. See Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2010) (comparing 
administrative closures to indefinite continuances). 
 233. Questions and Answers:  USCIS-American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) 
Meeting, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 11 (Oct. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Questions 
and Answers:  USCIS-AILA], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2012/October%20
2012/AILA-Liaison-Committee-meetingQA.pdf. 
HEEREN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:55 PM 
2015] THE STATUS OF NONSTATUS 1159 
with administratively closed cases can seek work permission as long 
as they pay a fee and file an application to renew their work permit 
annually.234  However, it would be risky and unwise in most cases for 
a person with an administratively closed removal case to travel 
outside of the United States.235 
Some individuals with administratively closed removal cases may 
have had status going into proceedings.  For example, sometimes 
LPRs are put in proceedings based on criminal convictions.  When 
LPRs’ cases are administratively closed, they remain, essentially, LPRs 
and can access most of the rights that LPRs enjoy.236  However, many 
individuals with administratively closed proceedings have no status 
before proceedings begin.  In these cases, their status is converted to 
                                                           
 234. Applications such as those for asylum, lawful permanent residency, and 
cancellation of removal come with a contingent right to seek work permission while 
the case is being adjudicated.  See 8 C.F.R. § 274a(c)(8)–(10) (2014).  USCIS does 
not always grant these applications:  it considers itself to have discretion to deny 
them.  See Questions and Answers:  USCIS-AILA, supra note 233, at 11. 
 235. Travel outside of the United States will not deprive the Immigration Court of 
jurisdiction over the administratively closed but technically still pending removal 
proceeding.  See In re Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I. & N. Dec. 43, 44 (BIA 2012).  Thus, to 
the extent that a person with an administratively closed case is relying on the 
technical pendency of some application for relief in the removal case as a basis for 
seeking work permission, travel should not impact the person’s eligibility for work 
permission.  Moreover, because removal proceedings are already pending, a traveler 
with an administratively closed case arguably should not be subject to expedited 
removal procedures that might otherwise cause her to be removed summarily at the 
border upon her return without access to a court hearing.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1225 
(2012) (expedited removal), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (removal before an IJ).  However, 
it is difficult to predict precisely how DHS would deal with such a case.  It might take 
the position that it can deny reentry, and it is extraordinarily difficult to challenge 
DHS’s actions at the border.  See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 635 (2006).  Alternatively, DHS might allow reentry but use the new 
entry as a basis to reopen the closed removal proceeding. Persons with 
administratively closed cases who had a pending application for adjustment of status 
might be able to obtain some sense of security about traveling by filing an 
application for advance parole, but it is difficult, again, to predict how DHS would 
deal with an application filed by a person who is technically in removal proceedings.  
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORM I-131, INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
APPLICATION FOR TRAVEL DOCUMENT 1 (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/form/i-131instr.pdf (noting that Advance Parole is available 
to persons with a pending application for adjustment of status). 
 236. USCIS might also be suspicious of petitions filed by LPRs in removal 
proceedings for their family members to obtain green cards. In addition, the status 
of LPRs with administratively closed proceedings is less secure than other LPRs, since 
their proceedings could be recalendared and they could be deported at that time. It 
would be risky for an LPR with an administratively closed removal proceeding to 
travel outside the United States.  See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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nonstatus.  They might be able to work, but they have few other 
rights.  Their nonstatus is not due to the operation of a statute but is 
purely a function of prosecutorial discretion.  Should ICE’s priorities 
change, their cases can be recalendared and they might be deported. 
As the description of Sergio’s case in the Introduction 
demonstrates, it is now common for ICE attorneys to begin merits 
hearings by offering prosecutorial discretion in cases where the 
applicant has a claim for status.  Prosecutorial discretion seems to be 
partly morphing into a kind of plea bargaining process—a means for 
government attorneys to leverage noncitizens into agreeing to give up 
their right to a more secure benefit, like asylum.237  Sergio ended up 
winning his asylum case.  However, many noncitizens or their lawyers 
are more risk-averse than he was, and, as a result, there are a growing 
number of individuals with nonstatus who might have become 
asylees, LPRs, and eventually, citizens. 
H. Deferred Action, Part II 
Between 2000 and 2010, the INS and USCIS expanded deferred 
action from a case-by-case means of benefiting a small number of 
unauthorized immigrants with sympathetic cases to a benefit awarded 
categorically to groups of unauthorized immigrants:  VAWA self-
petitioners, U visa applicants, foreign students impacted by 
Hurricane Katrina, widows and widowers of U.S. citizens, and 
unauthorized immigrant family members of military servicemen.  The 
numbers of grantees may have remained relatively modest, but they 
were almost certainly in the thousands.  For example, nearly 67,000 
VAWA self-petitioners received deferred action during this time 
period.238  Although most of them might have ultimately adjusted 
status, a substantial number will likely always remain in deferred 
action because of stringent grounds of inadmissibility that 
disproportionately impact that demographic.239  The next subpart will 
                                                           
 237. See supra note 9 (discussing the author’s e-mail survey of other clinical 
professors of immigration clinics concerning this issue). 
 238. See KANDEL, supra note 208. 
 239. This analysis shows that past statistics concerning deferred action grants 
during this time period are radically inaccurate.  In 2004, Leon Wildes summarized 
Freedom of Information Act data he had obtained from USCIS for “records of all 
cases where deferred action status has been granted.”  Wildes, Deferred Action Program, 
supra note 187, at 825–27.  In response, he received records of 499 deferred action 
grants from two of the three USCIS offices—a figure that obviously cannot be correct 
in light of the thousands of VAWA and U visa deferred action grants made up to 
2004.  Id.  In 2010, Professor Shoba Wadhia obtained data from USCIS on deferred 
action requests from 2003 through 2010, which purported to show an even more 
HEEREN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:55 PM 
2015] THE STATUS OF NONSTATUS 1161 
show that after 2010, the number of deferred action grants began to 
grow even more rapidly. 
1. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
Congress has repeatedly tried and failed to undertake reform on 
behalf of Dreamers—undocumented youths who came to the United 
States as children.240  Although a broad bipartisan coalition agrees 
that these youth are not to blame for being without status and are in 
fact important to the future of this country, Congress has not been 
able to pass the DREAM Act, the piece of legislation after which they 
are named.241  Frustrated by congressional inertia, these courageous 
youth mobilized to convince the Obama Administration to unilaterally 
order a deportation reprieve for them.242  In June 2012, the 
Administration implemented a new program for the “Dreamers,” 
with the far less inspiring name, Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA).243 
The new program was designed to track the DREAM Act.  
Accordingly, DACA contains a series of requirements related to the 
applicant’s age, residence, physical presence, immigration status, 
schooling, and criminal record.244  USCIS created an application 
                                                           
woefully inaccurate figure:  forty-eight deferred action grants.  Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, Sharing Secrets:  Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 
10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 42 (2012).  As Professor Wadhia observed in her article, USCIS’s 
failure to provide coherent statistics reveals that its implementation of the program 
lacks transparency.  Id. at 48–49. 
 240. The term “Dreamer” comes from the Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors Act first introduced in the Senate on August 1, 2001 by Senators 
Richard Durbin and Orrin Hatch.  S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001).  Members of both 
houses of Congress have reintroduced the bill several times, but Congress has never 
passed it.  See generally S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1275, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 
774, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 5131, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2075, 109th Cong. 
(2005); S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1684, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 241. See sources cited supra note 240. 
 242. See Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to 
Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/ 
us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html. 
 243. See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 184, at 1 (describing DACA). 
 244. See DACA FAQ, supra note 20. Essentially, USCIS requires that a DACA 
applicant show that she age was under the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012, that 
she arrived in the United States before her sixteenth birthday, and that she has 
maintained a current and continuous residence in the United States since June 15, 
2007.  Id.  Further, USCIS requires that a DACA applicant make her request for 
consideration of deferred action by demonstrating that she entered the country 
without inspection or that her immigration status expired before June 15, 2012.  Id.  
A DACA applicant must also show that she is either in school or has graduated from 
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form, filing fee, and set of pro se materials to help applicants.245  By 
September 2014, USCIS had granted 632,855 DACA applications246—
an explosion of nonstatus that has unleashed a fierce debate 
concerning executive power.247 
                                                           
high school (or obtained a General Education Development certificate) or that she is 
an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United 
States.  Id.  Finally, she must not have been convicted of a felony, significant 
misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors and she must not otherwise pose a 
threat to national security or public safety.  Id. 
 245. See id. (providing an in-depth explanations of eligibility requirements, 
outlining the DACA application guidelines, and providing a link to the DACA 
application itself).  See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORM I-
821D, CONSIDERATION FOR DEFERRED ACTION OF CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (2014), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-821d.pdf (constituting 
the DACA application form). 
 246. Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals by 
Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status: 2012–2014, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/ 
Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/
DACA/DACA_fy2014_qtr4.pdf (last visited May 11, 2015). 
 247. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 781, 856–57 (2013) (arguing that there is no general presidential 
nonenforcement power because the Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes a duty 
on the President to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all 
situations); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
671, 768–69 (2014) (arguing that the President’s nonenforcement authority does not 
extend to prospective licensing of prohibited conduct or to policy-based 
nonenforcement of federal laws for entire categories of offenders unless Congress 
affirmatively expands Executive discretion). For a response to Delahunty and Yoo, 
see Wadhia, supra note 216, at 60, 70–71 (attacking Delhaunty and Yoo’s Take Care 
Clause arguments on the following three grounds:  (1) the Obama Administration 
has faithfully and forcefully executed the immigration laws, (2) prosecutorial 
discretion actions do not undercut statutory law because such actions have been 
pursued by other U.S. presidents and a part of the immigration system for at least 
three decades, and (3) the act of equating DACA’s limbo status to the secure status 
offered by the DREAM Act is an unfair and inaccurate comparison).  For a critique 
of the prosecutorial discretion rationale for DACA but defense of it on other 
grounds, see Margulies, supra note 194, at 122–26 (contending that before DACA, 
deferred action was only offered on a case-by-case basis and the lack of precedent for 
categorical deferred action means that the use of prosecutorial discretion as a 
rationale runs afoul of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. President could not seize private 
property absent express authorization from Congress or an authority enumerated 
under Article II of the Constitution).  This Article’s discussion of VAWA deferred 
action and other types of categorical deferred conflicts with this analysis. 
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2. Deferred Action for Parental Accountability 
On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced a series of 
new administrative immigration initiatives.248  Through DHS, the 
President expanded DACA to include more individuals and increased 
the duration of DACA work permits to three years instead of two.249  
The initiatives also created a new nonstatus for the parents of LPRs 
and U.S. citizens entitled DAPA.250  An estimated four million 
immigrants may qualify for nonstatus under the changes, dramatically 
raising the stakes in the constitutional debate over executive power.251 
Anticipating legal conflict, DOJ took the unusual step of releasing 
its internal memo concluding that the government has authority for 
the new programs.  DOJ concluded that the President had 
prosecutorial discretion to defer some deportations given his limited 
resources and the vast population of unauthorized immigrants.252  
DOJ also found that the President had prosecutorial discretion to 
defer removal of the parents of LPRs and U.S. citizens but not the 
parents of DACA recipients.253  DOJ thus suggested that deferring 
deportation for the parents of citizens and LPRs was consistent with 
past executive actions and compatible with other preferential 
treatment given to these groups by immigration law.254  By contrast, 
                                                           
 248. See generally Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, R. Gil 
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 1–5 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_acti
on.pdf (discussing the use of deferred action for individuals who came to the United 
States as children and the parents of U.S. citizens or permanent residents). 
 249. See id. at 3–4 (outlining the policy changes to expand DACA, including 
removing the then-existing age cap, extending DACA’s employment authorization to 
three-year increments, and expanding the eligibility cut-off date from 2007–2010). 
 250. See id. at 4 (stating that to be eligible for prosecutorial discretion under 
DAPA, individuals must (1) have a child that is a citizen or LPR, (2) have 
continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 2010, (3) be physically 
present in the United States on the date of the memorandum as well as when 
applying for deferred action, (4) have no lawful status, and (5) not be an 
enforcement priority as of the date of the memorandum). 
 251. See Nakamura, supra note 15. (noting that some opponents have warned that 
Obama’s action could trigger confrontation with Congress). 
 252. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. 9 (Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 
Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf. 
 253. Id. at 33. 
 254. Id. at 31. 
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DOJ found no similar treatment in immigration law toward the 
undocumented parents of DACA recipients.255 
The reaction to DAPA was immediate and highly polarized.  In 
Washington, D.C., immigrants rallied at the White House to thank 
the President.256  Not long afterward, the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed a resolution to halt the executive actions.257  
Twenty-two states, four governors, and the Attorney General of 
Michigan sued DHS to enjoin DAPA, arguing that it violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the President’s constitutional duty 
to “take care” to enforce the law.258  On February 16, 2015, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, effectively putting DAPA and 
the expansion of DACA on hold until the litigation winds its way 
through the appeals process.259 
This debate over the limits of executive power will continue to play 
out in the courts, Congress, academia and the media in the months 
and years ahead.260  Missing in this debate is the impact of nonstatus 
on the affected individuals.  Part III addresses this question. 
                                                           
 255. See id. at 32–33 (reasoning that immigration laws are more concerned with 
uniting individuals who are legally entitled to live in the United States than they are 
with uniting individuals who lack lawful status). 
 256. Pamela Constable & Julie Zauzmer, Illegal Immigrants to Rally at White House, 
Thank Obama for Deportation Reprieve, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/illegal-immigrants-to-rally-at-white-house-
thank-obama-for-deportation-reprieve/2014/11/21/145ccea0-71a0-11e4-893f-
86bd390a3340_story.html. 
 257. See Jeremy W. Peters & Ashley Parker, On War and Immigration, Obama Faces 
Tests of Authority from Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014 at A21 (noting that the vote 
for the resolution was largely symbolic). 
 258. See Complaint at 25–27, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-CV-254 (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 3, 2014) (reasoning that because Congress has already addressed when the 
parent of a U.S. citizen may change their status, DAPA represents a departure from 
the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws and stands in contradiction to the 
laws enacted by Congress).  The Take Care Clause prevents the President from 
discarding laws he disfavors by requiring the President to faithfully execute the laws 
in place.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”).  The 
complaint originally included only fourteen plaintiffs; additional plaintiffs joined the 
suit after its filing.  See Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-CV-254, 2015 WL 648579, at 
*1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015). 
 259. Texas, 2015 WL 648579, at *62. 
 260. For a sampling of the different views concerning President Obama’s 
immigration executive actions, compare Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 247, at 856 
(arguing that the Take Care Clause mandates, with limited exceptions, that the 
President enforces congressional enactments and that DACA constitutes a violation 
of this requirement), with Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 193, at 483–519 (noting 
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III. THE IMPACT OF NONSTATUS 
Venerable Gon’yô asked Jôshû, “How is it when a person does not 
have a single thing?”  Jôshû said, “Throw it away.”  Gon’yô said, “I 
say I don’t have a single thing.  What could I ever throw away?”  
Jôshû said, “If so, carry it around with you.” 
- Hongzhi Zhengjue261 
Nonstatus challenges us with a paradox:  nonstatus is neither status 
nor its absence, and those who have it are neither lawfully nor 
unlawfully present.  As we saw in Part II, it is a growing enigma.  
Hundreds of thousands of individuals with no status are now being 
offered nonstatus through mass prosecutorial discretion programs 
like DACA, and millions more may soon receive nonstatus through 
DAPA.262  Some who would have previously won status in immigration 
court hearings are now taking nonstatus through a quasi-plea 
bargaining process in order to avoid the risk of deportation.  
Nonstatus is bleeding into the margins of status and no status and 
occupying a greater percentage of the immigrant population.  The 
growth of this category raises important questions:  why is nonstatus 
growing, and what does the future hold for individuals in nonstatus? 
A. Benefits 
Congressional and public opposition to granting immigrants social 
and economic benefits is one reason for the expansion of the 
nonstatus category over time.  One of the most virulent political 
narratives relates to the “welfare magnet”—the notion that this or 
that group of individuals will move to a particular jurisdiction to 
collect welfare benefits.263  In the 1990s, the Gingrich Congress 
                                                           
doctrinal confusion concerning whether the Executive or Congress possess inherent 
authority over immigration and noting various examples in practice of the Executive 
exercising inherent authority over immigration), and Price, supra note 247, at 674–75 
(asserting that notwithstanding the Take Care Clause, the President may decline to 
enforce civil and criminal prohibitions in particular cases but not with respect to 
entire categories of persons). 
 261. GERRY SHISHIN WICK, THE BOOK OF EQUANIMITY:  ILLUMINATING CLASSIC ZEN 
KOANS 178 (2005) (quoting Case 57:  Gon’yô’s One “Thing”). 
 262. See David Nakamura, Obama Readies Executive Action on Immigration, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-readies-
executive-action-to-legalize-millions-of-undocumented-
immigrants/2014/08/01/222ae2e8-18f8-11e4-85b6-c1451e622637_story.html 
(reporting that in framing DACA, legislators sought to define a broader category of 
immigrants that could receive similar benefits as the 2012 Dreamers). 
 263. See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren & Melissa Healy, Gingrich Backs Wilson on Illegal 
Immigrant Costs, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-02-
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passed reforms that dramatically restricted the receipt of welfare 
benefits for immigrants, based in part on the misguided belief that 
noncitizens collect welfare benefits at a disproportionately high 
rate.264  One reason it is so difficult to pass immigration reform 
today is no doubt the continued prevalence of the notion that 
individuals who are legalized as a result of reform will drain coffers 
by collecting public benefits.265  Immigrant rights—particularly those 
closely associated with citizenship, such as voting—are embattled, 
too.  Nonstatus comes with far fewer benefits, rights, and privileges 
than status, although even these benefits can be controversial.  This 
Part offers a sketch of the limited benefits that come with nonstatus 
and contends that nonstatus is growing in part because it offers a 
means to authorize the presence of undocumented immigrants 
without providing them the panoply of benefits and rights that go 
with full status. 
Until 1996, individuals with nonstatus were eligible for some public 
benefits under the theory that they were “persons residing under 
color of law” (PRUCOL).266  Individuals with nonstatus like deferred 
action and EVD were considered PRUCOL because the INS was 
aware of their presence and was not actively pursuing their 
deportation.267  However, in 1996, the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) banned 
noncitizens from receiving most federal public benefits unless they 
could show that they met a narrow definition of “qualified alien” and 
                                                           
09/news/mn-30042_1_illegal-immigrants (quoting U.S. Representative David Cook, 
who sought to justify Congress’s move to restrict benefits to immigrants when he said 
that “[w]e don’t want to be a welfare magnet for the world”). 
 264. Bill Ong Hing, Don’t Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor:  Conflicted Immigrant 
Stories and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 167–68, 170 (1998) 
(describing the unsupported rhetoric and mistaken economic analysis concerning 
immigrant welfare use). 
 265. For a rebuttal of the dubious notion that immigrants move to the United 
States to collect benefits or that they receive welfare benefits at a disproportionately 
high rate, see id. at 170–78. 
 266. See Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1977) (interpreting a 
provision of the Social Security Act and its implementing regulation authorizing 
payments to an alien “permanently residing in the United States under color of law” 
to include a noncitizen whom the INS had decided not to deport for humanitarian 
reasons (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 267. See, e.g., id. at 849–51 (holding that where a “responsible official” of the INS, 
aware that an individual was unlawfully residing in the United States, chooses not to 
institute deportation proceedings for humanitarian reasons, that individual can be 
said to be living “under the color of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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had held that status for five years.268  Individuals with nonstatus were 
excluded, with the exception of those with withholding of removal 
and grants of parole for more than one year.269 
Today, those with nonstatus largely remain ineligible for public 
benefits like food stamps, cash assistance, public housing, social 
security benefits such as Supplemental Security Income and Social 
Security Disability Insurance, and federally guaranteed student loans, 
despite the fact that they typically pay taxes to support this social 
welfare system.270  There are some notable exceptions to the fact that 
those with nonstatus are ineligible for public benefits.  Nonetheless, 
even with these exceptions, access to benefits is restricted.  For 
example, individuals are eligible for Medicare if they are at least sixty-
five years old and eligible for social security retirement benefits.271  To 
be eligible for social security retirement benefits, a person must be 
“lawfully present.”272  A regulation defines “lawfully present” for 
retirement benefits and includes noncitizens with a variety of forms 
of nonstatus, including deferred action.273  However, the regulation’s 
definition of lawfully present omits some important forms of 
                                                           
 268. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 401, 403, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261, 2265 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613 (2012)) (making exceptions for emergency 
medical assistance, emergency disaster relief, public health assistance, programs for 
community development assistance, and programs or services specified by the Attorney 
General that deliver community services necessary for protection of life and safety). 
 269. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (defining “qualified alien” to include LPRs, 
asylees, refugees, persons paroled for a period of at least one year, persons 
granted withholding of removal, persons granted conditional entry, and Cuban 
and Haitian entrants). 
 270. See TANYA BRODER & JONATHAN BLAZER, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., 
OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 2–3 & n.11 (2011), 
available at http://www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html (observing that 
the welfare reform does not clarify what specific programs are covered under the 
term “federal public benefit” but rather defines federal public benefit as “any 
retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary 
education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit”). 
 271. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(3) (excepting “lawfully present” individuals from 
the general prohibition of federal benefits for aliens); 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (stating 
that the title protects hospital and health services for those who are sixty-five 
years of age and over). 
 272. Congress exempted retirement benefits under Social Security from the list of 
federal public benefits for which a noncitizen must be a “qualified alien” and wait 
five years for eligibility pursuant to PRWORA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2).  Instead the 
SSA only requires that aliens be “lawfully present.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 402(y) 
(affirming that an alien may not collect any benefit during any month in which he or 
she is not lawfully present in the United States). 
 273. 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(3)–(4) (2014). 
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nonstatus, such as individuals granted work permits pursuant to ICE 
supervision.274  Individuals whose cases have been administratively 
closed as a result of ICE prosecutorial discretion will likely not qualify 
for social security retirement benefits unless they can show that they 
have a pending asylum, withholding of removal, CAT, or adjustment 
of status application.275  Therefore, under the current system, hundreds 
of thousands of individuals with administratively closed cases and ICE 
supervision orders will spend the rest of their lives paying into a social 
security system without ever seeing any benefits for themselves. 
It is striking how inconsistent the public benefit eligibility rules are.  
For example, there is a difference between the categories of 
nonstatus holders ineligible for medical benefits under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and those who qualify for retirement 
benefits and Medicare.  Like the Social Security Act, the ACA 
considers people who are “lawfully present” in the United States to be 
eligible for care under the legislation.276  However, its regulations 
have a distinct definition of “lawfully present.”  As is the case in the 
Social Security Act, individuals with deferred action are eligible for 
                                                           
 274. Id. § 1.3(a)(1)–(4) (limiting the category of “lawfully present” aliens to 
individuals who are “qualified alien[s]” and have been inspected and admitted to the 
United States, paroled into the United States, or permitted to remain in the United 
States for humanitarian or other policy reasons or who applied for asylum or 
withholding of removal); 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(iii) (2013) (defining as lawfully 
present aliens granted work permission pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18) for 
persons released on an order of supervision). 
 275. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.3(a)(3)(vii)–(a)(5) (limiting “lawfully present” for the 
purposes of applying for Social Security as a qualified alien, an alien who has been 
inspected and admitted to the United States, an alien who has been paroled into the 
United States, or an alien who has been permitted to stay in the United States for 
certain delineated humanitarian or policy purposes (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 276. See 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (stating that individuals who are not citizens, 
nationals, or lawfully present aliens may not be covered under a qualified health 
plan).  The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has not included the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the definition of either “federal public benefit” or 
“federal means-tested public benefit” in the only notices that it has published on the 
issue, which predate the ACA but appear to constitute the agency’s final say on the 
matter.  See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PROWRA); Interpretation of “Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit”, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 45,256, 45,256 (Aug. 26, 1997) (defining “federal means-tested public benefits 
to be “only mandatory spending programs of the Federal Government” where 
eligibility is determined by income or resources); Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PROWRA); Interpretation of “Federal 
Public Benefit”, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,658, 41,658 (Aug. 4, 1998) (providing a list of 
federal public benefits, including Medicaid and Medicare).  As a result, the ACA is 
not subject to the restrictions on alien access to benefits contained in the PRWORA. 
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ACA benefits.277  However, individuals with DACA are explicitly 
excluded, and the Obama administration has announced that it will 
also bar DAPA recipients from receiving benefits under the ACA.278  
Some states have stepped in to bridge the gap and cover DACA 
recipients and possibly individuals with DAPA, creating an 
inconsistent patchwork of medical benefits across the country.279  In 
some states, nonstatus holders can only obtain emergency medical 
care; in others, some individuals with nonstatus are eligible for some 
state-funded medical care.280 
Other privileges of nonstatus holders also vary from state to state.  
For example, at least some nonstatus holders may be eligible under 
federal law for unemployment benefits because they are considered 
“lawfully present.”281  However, states typically administer these 
programs, and some have banned DACA recipients from obtaining 
benefits.282  Likewise, some states offer in-state tuition to holders of 
some types of nonstatus, but others do not.283  Nonstatus holders’ 
                                                           
 277. See 45 C.F.R. § 152.2 (defining “lawfully present” to include “qualified 
aliens” and a wide range of other types of status and non-status, including deferred 
action); id. § 155.20 (defining “lawfully present” for purposes of the ACA by 
referencing 45 C.F.R. § 152.2, the pre-existing condition insurance plan 
regulations); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-1(g) (2014) (defining “lawfully present” by 
reference to 45 C.F.R. § 155.20). 
 278. See 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(8) (2013) (excluding DACA from the ACA); Michael D. 
Shear & Robert Pear, Obama’s Immigration Plan Could Shield Four Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2014, at A1 (reporting that the Administration will promulgate regulations 
to exclude DACA holders from the ACA). 
 279. Cindy Y. Rodriguez & Jaqueline Hurtado, States Work Around Obamacare to 
Help Undocumented Immigrants, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/09/us/ 
obamacare-undocumented-immigrants (last updated Apr. 9, 2014, 1:30 PM) (noting 
that California, Washington, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Washington, 
D.C. offer health insurance to persons granted deferred status). 
 280. See TANYA BRODER, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR, TABLE:  MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES 1–5 (2014), available at 
http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=159 (discussing the availability of different 
medical assistance programs in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia). 
 281. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (allowing payment to an alien provided she was 
“lawfully present for purposes of performing such services, or was permanently residing in 
the United States under color of law at the time such services were performed . . .”). 
 282. See, e.g., Daniel Gonzalez, Governor Cautions ‘Dreamers’, USA TODAY (Aug. 
16, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/USCP/PNI/Front%20Page/2012-08-16-
pni0816met-deferred-first-dayPNIBrd_ST_U.htm (discussing Governor Jan Brewer’s 
efforts to resist implementation of DACA in Arizona, such as by denying 
unemployment benefits to DACA recipients). 
 283. See Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien”, 46 WASHBURN 
L.J. 263, 278–81 (2007) (describing federal and state laws concerning in-state tuition 
for undocumented students); Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred:  Deferred Action, 
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eligibility for professional memberships like law and medicine will 
also vary depending on the state.284 
For many years, there was no question that those with nonstatus 
could apply for driver’s licenses.  However, the REAL ID Act of 2005 
requires states to deny driver’s licenses to individuals who do not 
meet certain immigration requirements.285  Most individuals with 
deferred action and TPS can obtain driver’s licenses because the 
federal REAL ID Act specifically lists deferred action and TPS as 
lawful immigration statuses.  However, the Act does not authorize 
states to provide a driver’s license to individuals with any other type 
of nonstatus, and several states have even tried to deny driver’s 
licenses to individuals with deferred action.286 
When it comes to many constitutional rights, nonstatus holders 
must contend with case law that has historically privileged LPRs over 
immigrants with lesser statuses.287  With respect to some types of 
                                                           
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of Dream Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 463, 464–67 (2012) (emphasizing that while some states, such as Rhode 
Island, have sought to incorporate undocumented students into the community by 
extending resident tuition, other states, such as New Jersey, have denied financial 
assistance to U.S. citizens with undocumented parents). 
 284. California has passed legislation that allows persons to be admitted to the bar 
regardless of their immigration status.  Jennifer Medina, Allowed to Join the Bar, but Not 
to Take a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/03/us/ 
immigrant-in-us-illegally-may-practice-law-california-court-rules.html?_r=0.  Florida 
allows DACA recipients to take the bar.  Jan Pudlow, Governor Signs Undocumented 
Attorney Bill, FLA. BAR NEWS (June 1, 2014), http://www.floridabar.org/ 
DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/RSSFeed/52B54E465C469EE785257CDD0044AFD4.  It is 
unclear whether individuals with nonstatus can practice law in any other states. 
 285. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2), 119 Stat. 302, 312–13; 
see 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2014) (defining a REAL ID driver’s license to be an identification 
card certified to be in compliance with the requirements of the REAL ID Act). 
 286. See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052, 1079 (D. 
Ariz. 2013), rev’d, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that Arizona’s efforts to 
deny driver’s licenses to persons with DACA violated equal protection); Saldana v. 
Lahm, No. 4:13CV3108, 2013 WL 5658233, at *1, *7 (D. Neb. Oct. 11, 2013) 
(granting in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss a challenge to Nebraska’s refusal 
to grant a driver’s license to a DACA grantee); 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (defining “lawful 
status” for the purpose of the REAL ID Act). 
 287. For a discussion of the rights of unauthorized immigrants relative to lawful 
permanent residents and citizens, see David A. Martin, supra note 25, at 92–101 
(ranking the hierarchy of immigrants in order of decreasing community 
membership as (1) citizens, (2) lawful permanent resident, (3) admitted 
nonimmigrant, (4) entrant without inspection, (5) parolee, and (6) applicant at the 
border); Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno v. American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee:  A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens?, 35 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 183, 193–95 (2000) (asserting that because deportation is not classified 
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nonstatus, like parole, the U.S. Supreme Court has bought into an 
“entry fiction” that has treated individuals as though they are outside 
the United States and are therefore afforded less due process even 
when they have been in the country for years.288 
Individuals with nonstatus have few immigration law privileges and 
many burdens.  Some cannot travel at all without being considered to 
have “self-deported”; others can travel with “advance parole,” but 
advance parole is difficult to obtain.289  Many forms of non-status, like 
DACA and DAPA, must be regularly renewed and at considerable 
cost.290  In addition to paying hundreds of dollars every few years to 
renew their work permission, nonstatus holders must also regularly 
update their address and appear at application support centers to be 
photographed and fingerprinted.291  Nonstatus holders cannot 
                                                           
as a “punishment,” the government has removed immigrants based on their political 
beliefs and associations); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2037, 2075–76 (2008) (suggesting that despite a Supreme Court holding that 
supported the right of unauthorized immigrant children to attend elementary and 
secondary school, states’ ability to restrict immigrant access to colleges and 
universities results in exclusion from the community); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights 
of Others:  Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1727 (2010) 
(examining efforts by states to address the arrival of undocumented immigrants, the 
workplace protections afforded to undocumented immigrants, the extent of Fourth 
Amendment protections for undocumented immigrants, and undocumented 
immigrants’ right to effective counsel in court); Allison Brownell Tirres, Property 
Outliers:  Noncitizens, Property Rights and State Power, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77, 90–91 
(2012) (demonstrating that when property is held by noncitizens, constitutional 
precepts only partially exist, and therefore states may use land laws to subordinate 
and exclude noncitizens). 
 288. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership:  The Dual Identity of the 
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 970 (1988) 
(reporting that some courts have asserted that excludable aliens are unprotected 
because by definition these aliens are “outside the United States” (though in fact 
they can be physically present in the United States) and constitutional protections 
only extend to the limits of the United States’s territory). 
 289. See, e.g., DACA FAQ, supra note 20 (explaining that DACA recipients must 
receive advance parole to travel and will only be granted advance parole if their 
travel is for humanitarian, educational, or employment purposes). 
 290. The current application fee for DACA is $465.  See I-821D, Consideration of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/i-821d (last visited May 11, 2015). 
 291. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-765, APPLICATION FOR 
EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 8 (Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/form/i-765instr.pdf. (explaining that the application filing 
fee is $380, that there is an additional $85 fee for “biometrics,” and that applicants 
might be required to appear for an interview and the collection of biometric data). 
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petition for family members to obtain legal status in the United 
States.292  No form of nonstatus comes with a pathway to citizenship. 
The one immigration benefit that does typically come with 
nonstatus is work permission, although often it is not automatic.293  
Individuals with nonstatus have been offered work permits since May 
1981, when the INS published its first ever regulation governing 
employment authorization.294  By 1981, the government had 
concluded that “[e]mployment in the United States is not an 
inherent right” but, rather, “a matter of administrative 
discretion . . . .”295  This philosophy marked a shift from the early 
twentieth century, when the Supreme Court held that the “right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of 
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was 
the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”296 
Perhaps because work was once seen as a right, not a privilege, the 
INA had never addressed the issue of work permission for 
noncitizens.297  Therefore, the INS had to strain to find statutory 
authority for its new regulation.  It cited section 103 of the INA, a 
provision that set out the powers of the Attorney General, including 
the power to “establish such regulations . . . and perform such other 
acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the 
provisions of this chapter.”298 
                                                           
 292. 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 31, § 31.03 (“Those who seek to immigrate as an 
‘immediate relative’ or on the basis of a family-sponsored preference require 
approval of a petition by the U.S. citizen or lawful-resident sponsor filed with the 
DHS agency having jurisdiction over the petitioner’s residence.”). 
 293. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014) (allowing work permission for a 
person granted deferred action if she can show economic necessity). 
 294. Employment Authorization to Aliens in the United States, 46 Fed. Reg. 
25,079, 25,080–81 (May 5, 1981) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 109) (distinguishing classes 
of aliens who receive work authorization as a condition of their admission from 
others which must apply for work authorization separately). 
 295. Id. at 25,080. 
 296. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 35, 41 (1915) (discussing the validity of an 
Arizona statute requiring employers to employ no less than eighty percent “qualified 
electors or native-born citizens of the United States” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357–59, 369–70 (1886) (discussing 
natural rights in the context of striking down a law regulating laundry businesses in 
San Francisco because unequal enforcement of the law violated equal protection). 
 297. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants:  
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 198–99 (2007) (explaining that 
prior to the IRCA’s passage, there were no criminal penalties for employers who 
hired undocumented workers and no additional penalties for undocumented 
workers who worked). 
 298. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982). 
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The new work permission regulation was relatively expansive and 
authorized a grant of work permission for two types of nonstatus:  
voluntary departure (presumably including EVD) and deferred 
action.299  In November 1981, the INS added a work authorization 
category for individuals granted parole.300  Although the regulation 
specified who could be granted authority to work, it said nothing 
about what would happen to individuals who worked without 
permission.  In practice, there was no real regulation of unauthorized 
work until Congress passed IRCA in 1986.301  IRCA contained a new 
provision defining an “unauthorized alien” not entitled to work in 
the United States as a noncitizen who is neither an LPR nor 
“authorized to be . . . employed by this chapter or by the Attorney 
General.”302  The provision thus acknowledged the Attorney 
General’s (and INS’s) pre-existing practice of administratively 
deciding which categories of aliens could lawfully work.303 
Despite the fact that non-status holders have previously been 
permitted to work in the United States, the provision of work 
permission to DACA and DAPA grantees has been one of the most 
controversial features of the new programs.304  At one time, nonstatus 
holders could work without special permission and obtain driver’s 
licenses and apply for the same public benefits as citizens.  However, 
now, privileges and benefits of these types vary depending on arcane 
eligibility rules and the politics of individual states.  The one relatively 
durable and consistent benefit granted to most nonstatus holders 
seems to be work permission—a privilege that was once a right in 
American society. 
                                                           
 299. 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(5)–(6) (1982). 
 300. Id. § 109.1(b)(4). 
 301. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 115, 
274A, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360, 3384 (making employment of unauthorized immigrants 
unlawful and increasing enforcement of existing immigration laws). 
 302. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (1988). 
 303. See Employment Authorization; Classes of Aliens Eligible, 52 Fed. Reg. 
46,092, 46,093 (Dec. 4, 1987) (to be codified 8 C.F.R. pt. 109) (rejecting a petition 
asking the INS to rescind its employment authorization regulation and rejecting an 
argument that “the phrase ‘authorized to be so employed by this Act or the Attorney 
General’ does not recognize the Attorney General’s authority to grant work 
authorization except to those aliens who have already been granted specific 
authorization by the Act”). 
 304. See The Repeal Executive Amnesty Act of 2015, H.R. 191, 114th Cong. § 104 
(2015) (proposing to eliminate the Attorney General’s discretion to grant 
employment authorization to persons otherwise not entitled to work under the INA). 
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As nonstatus expands, it seems, the privileges of non-status holders 
narrow.  When nonstatus was an arcane benefit available to only 
thousands of individuals, it flew far enough below the political radar 
that individuals with it could collect many benefits without risking 
public ire.  But once it exploded, the rights and benefits of nonstatus 
holders burst, too.  The Obama Administration’s exclusion of DACA 
and DAPA from the ACA offers a portrait of what nonstatus will look 
like in the future, as politicians working to expand the boundaries of 
nonstatus need to water down its benefits in order to address the 
welfare magnet narrative. 
B. The Future 
It is likely that legal challenges to DACA and DAPA will ultimately 
fail because prosecutorial discretion decisions are usually isolated 
from judicial review and the challengers lack much evidence of real 
injury.305  However, the greater danger to nonstatus comes not from 
the courts but from the political branches.  Nonstatus can be 
eliminated based on the shifting whims of the Executive Branch or by 
a Congress displeased with perceived executive overreaching.306 
Nonstatus is rarely cabined by statutory language, notice and 
comment rulemaking, or judicial oversight. It is usually an exercise of 
sole executive prerogative and, therefore, can theoretically be 
undone as easily as it can be wrought.  To repeal a statute, there must 
be hearings, majority votes in both houses of Congress, and a 
presidential signature.307  To amend a regulation, an agency must 
publish notice and solicit and consider comments—sometimes 
hundreds of thousands of them.308  Both congressional and executive 
                                                           
 305. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (recognizing that “an 
agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal 
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion”); 
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 247, at 786, 796 (arguing that the President’s duty to 
faithfully execute the laws conflicts with the widely held understanding that 
executive power “includes the discretion to decline enforcement of federal laws at 
any time, place, or case”). 
 306. E.g., The Repeal Executive Amnesty Act of 2015, H.R. 191, 114th Cong. §§ 
401–402 (2015) (restricting the definition of “lawfully present in the United States,” 
thus reducing who is eligible for certain benefits (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 307. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (announcing that for a bill to become law, it must pass 
both the House of Representatives and the Senate and receive the President’s signature). 
 308. See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,192, 59,192 (Sept. 23, 
2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 8) (noting that before adopting new 
Internet protections, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) undertook a 
public inquiry and received over 100,000 comments); Elise Hu, A Fascinating Look 
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actions are subject to judicial review.  By contrast, when an 
administration changes its prosecutorial priorities, it need not make 
even so much as an announcement and the changed priorities are 
likely insulated from judicial oversight. 
Thus, over the years various nonstatus programs have come and 
gone.  INS made up EVD, the Reagan Administration nearly 
abandoned it, and then the first Bush Administration resurrected it 
with a new name, DED.  Every year or two, the individuals with DED 
and its statutory cousin, TPS, wait anxiously to learn whether their 
status will be extended for another period.  The existence of their 
status is year-to-year—dependent on political whims. 
In some ways, the executive creation of nonstatus does not 
resemble an act of lawmaking so much as it does a massive 
government registration program.  In order to obtain work permits, 
individuals with nonstatus voluntarily disclose their whereabouts, 
work and family histories, and other biographic data.  They are 
fingerprinted, photographed, and annually tracked.  This is all the 
information that ICE would need to deport hundreds of thousands of 
individuals if its prosecutorial priorities ever shift again in the future.  
Mass deportation of nonstatus holders is unlikely because it would 
probably be too expensive and controversial.  However, it is 
important to acknowledge the possibility that at least some nonstatus 
holders might be deported. 
The fact that nonstatus can be eliminated does not mean that it will 
be, but its changeability will have an impact on the lives of individuals 
with nonstatus either way.  Consider Liberians with DED:  the most 
recent renewal of Liberian DED occurred just four days before it was 
set to expire.309  Imagine how difficult it must have been for these 
individuals to plan for the future without knowing whether their 
presence in the United States would continue to be authorized or not. 
Critics argue that DACA is more like lawmaking than prosecutorial 
discretion.  But, one central feature of the law is that it provides 
stability.310  For better or worse, established rules allow individuals to 
                                                           
Inside Those 1.1 Million Open-Internet Comments, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 12, 2014, 
1:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/08/12/339710293/a-
fascinating-look-inside-those-1-1-million-open-internet-comments (reporting that the 
response to new Internet protections was so immense that the FCC’s server crashed 
and the deadline for receiving public comments had to be extended). 
 309. See Press Release, White House, supra note 64 (extending deferral 
employment authorization for an additional twenty-four months). 
 310. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 2–3 (1961) (observing that while 
there may be many different opinions on what exactly law is, there is a general 
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govern their lives.  Nonstatus does not provide this certainty.  
Although programs like DACA resemble lawmaking in many ways, a 
chief difference is that these programs are more ephemeral. 
Another feature of the law is that it allows similarly situated 
individuals to be treated equally.  But, the implementation of 
nonstatus has often been arbitrary or even discriminatory.  For years, 
the INS offered EVD to Cubans but refused in the 1980s to grant it to 
Salvadorans whose lives were in great risk.311  When ICE first began its 
2011 review of pending cases for administrative closure, it did not 
consider same-sex relationships to be a positive factor weighing in 
favor of prosecutorial discretion to the same extent as opposite-sex 
relationships.  It was not until a year later that the agency released a 
memo clarifying that it would not discriminate against same-sex 
partners.312  Moreover, there are vast disparities in general in the 
operation of the prosecutorial discretion program.  It appears that 
some ICE Chief Counsel offices have exercised their prosecutorial 
discretion to administratively close cases much more than others.313 
It is difficult to challenge these sorts of arbitrary or discriminatory 
decisions concerning nonstatus because they are so discretionary and 
because there is no real process for doing so.  Professor Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia has urged that prosecutorial discretion programs 
should be subject to APA review.314  This would be an improvement 
for those lucky or ambitious enough to find lawyers able to mount 
                                                           
understanding that laws create a system in each country and that these legal systems 
are generally similar in structure). 
 311. See supra notes 115, 127, 129 and accompanying text (observing that the 
failure of the Reagan Administration to extend EVD to Salvadorans resulted in 
Salvadorans receiving TPS or DED instead). 
 312. See Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigr. & 
Customs Enforcement, et al., to All Field Office Dirs., All Chief Counsel, All Special 
Agents in Charge 1 (Oct. 5, 2012) (clarifying that long-term same-sex relationships 
are considered “family relationships” when the individuals are in monogamous 
relationships, intend to stay in those relationships, and maintain common residences 
and financial assets). 
 313. See TRAC, supra note 7 (finding that as of January 2014, prosecutorial 
discretion was used more frequently than in 2012 but less frequently than in 2013). 
 314. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge:  
Examining the Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 39, 47 (2013) (reasoning that prosecutorial directives give judges considerable 
guidance in reviewing decisions and that courts favor interpretations of statutes 
allowing judicial review of agency action). 
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such challenges, but it would also represent a doctrinal sea change 
and is, therefore, probably not very likely in the short term.315 
Furthermore, the potential benefits that come with nonstatus are 
also sometimes apportioned in a discriminatory or at least seemingly 
arbitrary way.  For example, individuals with deferred action are 
generally eligible for medical coverage under the ACA, but DACA 
(and soon DAPA) recipients are excluded.316  This type of 
discrimination is infectious because of the questionable “welfare 
magnet” notion that individuals will illegally migrate to the United 
States in the hope that they will be able to collect public benefits.317  
To address the argument that immigrants will be a drain on 
American society, policymakers will likely continuously water down 
the limited rights, privileges, and benefits that come with nonstatus.  
Courts will probably not protect nonstatus holders from such 
discrimination despite the fact that they are exactly the type of 
discrete and insular minority that benefit from heightened equal 
protection review in other contexts.318  The Supreme Court often 
strikes down discrimination concerning immigrant benefits at the 
state level, but it has been unwilling to uphold equal protection 
challenges filed to challenge federal discrimination, no matter how 
irrational it may be.319 
Nonstatus offers few rights and many risks.  Why would anyone 
accept such a tenuous, tentative, and temporary benefit?  In some 
cases, such as instances where removal proceedings have been 
administratively closed, accepting nonstatus is a rational calculation 
made to avoid possible deportation.  However, many people, like 
DACA applicants, have affirmatively applied for nonstatus.  For those 
individuals, the act of seeking nonstatus is one of tremendous courage. 
                                                           
 315. See Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Att’y Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1271 
(1986) (holding that the APA does not authorize judicial review of the Attorney 
General’s decision not to grant EVD), vacated, 808 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 316. See 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(8) (2013) (excluding DACA from the ACA). 
 317. See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text. 
 318. For a discussion of the argument that the Equal Protection Clause should 
be used to protect “discrete and insular minorities” who are left vulnerable in a 
democracy, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 75–76 (1980) (analyzing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
 319. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228–30 (1982) (striking down a state 
statute that prevented the use of state funding for the education of undocumented 
immigrant children), with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) (concluding that 
the judiciary does not have broad power to review decisions made by Congress and 
the President with respect to immigration). 
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While individual courage is admirable, collective courage is 
formidable.  In order to obtain DACA, thousands of youths and their 
families mobilized and lobbied the Obama Administration.  They 
created a political movement, as a result of which some of the most 
marginalized individuals in this society have achieved work 
permission, a chance at a higher education, and the ability to open 
bank accounts and legally drive.  These are transformational rights 
for unauthorized immigrants.  Thus, there is another way to see 
nonstatus—not as a massive government registration and surveillance 
program, but as a civil rights movement. 
Through political mobilization, nonstatus may morph into 
something better for at least some of those who have it.  The 
examples of past nonstatus leading to status include EVD for Cubans, 
which eventually led to congressional passage of the Cuban 
Adjustment Act; EVD for Southeast Asians, which led to similar 
legislation for Indochinese adjustment of status; DED for Chinese 
students after Tiananmen Square, which was soon supplanted by the 
Chinese Student Protection Act; and the Family Fairness program, 
which was replaced by Family Unity. 320  The most secure form of 
nonstatus—TPS—came about after years of unsuccessful lobbying for 
Salvadorans to be granted EVD.321  Thus, there is reason behind the 
Dreamers’ faith that they might someday get something better.  
Nonstatus can sometimes be a way station en route to status. 
On the other hand, nonstatus could calcify.  The ability of millions 
of undocumented individuals to obtain nonstatus might reduce the 
pressure to pass actual immigration reform.  Business interests that 
have historically lobbied for reform might be appeased by the 
existence of a large new lawful work force.322  The tenuous nature of 
nonstatus might prevent its holders from pushing too hard for 
something better for fear of losing what they have.  Even if 
nonstatus becomes status for the most politically popular groups, 
like those with DACA, less visible and less politically connected 
groups will likely be left out. 
                                                           
 320. Designations of Temporary Protected Status and Fraud in Prior Amnesty Programs:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 27–31 (1999) (statement of Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center 
for Immigration Studies). 
 321. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 322. See Ngae, supra note 49, at 93–95 (explaining that business interests that 
benefited from the existence of a low-wage work force helped perpetuate the 
immigration policies that led to the existence of large numbers of undocumented 
immigrants in the United States). 
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The dangers of this situation need to be recognized.  Those with 
nonstatus will contribute to the country’s tax revenue without 
receiving their fair share of benefits, such as health care, and for 
some, social security retirement.  They will be more likely to suffer 
discrimination and less likely to be protected by the courts.  On the 
other hand, DHS will grow from nonstatus, gaining more and 
more officers to process millions of work permit renewal requests.323  
DHS has even claimed that it might be able to shift some of the fees 
from DAPA to fund ICE’s and CBP’s enforcement efforts—growing 
those agencies, too.324 
Although the immigration enforcement agencies may be 
nourished by nonstatus, nonstatus may guarantee that the United 
States will never solve its problem of unauthorized immigration.  The 
Executive Branch justifies most of its nonstatus programs as an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the face of an unauthorized 
population that is larger than what the government is capable of 
deporting.  In order for it to keep granting nonstatus, therefore, the 
government must always be faced with a massive undocumented 
population.325  Those undocumented immigrants who do not qualify 
for nonstatus will likely be subject to a new regime of hyper-
enforcement with ever-larger levels of resources directed against them. 
CONCLUSION 
The Executive Branch has offered nonstatus at least since the 
1920s, when the INS granted parole to excludable individuals with 
sympathetic cases.  By the 1950s, the Executive Branch was granting 
nonstatus to tens of thousands of individuals at a time as a type of 
de facto refugee admissions program.  Even after the 1980 passage 
                                                           
 323. See Joint Written Statement of Joseph Moore, Senior Financial Official, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Donald Neufeld, Associate Director, Service Center 
Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Daniel Renaud, Associate Director, 
Field Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Moore-Renaud-Neufeld%20Testimony.pdf (explaining that USCIS is funded 
through the fees it collects on applications and that it hires staff based on its 
projection of its adjudication workload). 
 324. “DHS has explained that, if anything, the proposed deferred action program 
might increase ICE’s and CBP’s efficiency by in effect using USCIS’s fee-funded 
resources to enable those enforcement divisions to more easily identify non-priority 
aliens and focus their resources on pursuing aliens who are strong candidates for 
removal.”  Thompson Memorandum, supra note 252, at 26. 
 325. See id. at 31 (noting that DACA recipients constitute only a small percentage 
of the total undocumented population). 
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of the Refugee Act created the formal statuses of refugee and asylee, 
Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton continued offering the 
nonstatus of EVD and DED to large numbers of individuals from 
countries in strife and to countries that implicated U.S. foreign 
policy interests. 
Throughout the same period, the INS also granted the nonstatus 
of “deferred action” on a case-by-case basis to deportable individuals 
with sympathetic cases.  After the 1996 restrictionist immigration 
reforms made more individuals deportable or inadmissible than 
ever before and eliminated many forms of immigration relief, INS 
and then DHS gradually expanded deferred action programs.  
Beginning with VAWA self-petitioners in the late 1990s, the 
Executive Branch continued to ramp up deferred action, 
categorically granting it to thousands of individuals.  At the same 
time, it also issued more and more supervision orders every year, 
netting a population of well over 600,000 persons subject to this 
form of indefinite immigration probation.326 
This expansion of nonstatus largely went uncontested until the 
Obama Administration inaugurated the DACA program, which drew 
considerable publicity and further polarized immigrant advocates 
and immigration restrictionists.  President Obama has since 
expanded nonstatus even further, offering to grant it to the parents 
of LPRs and U.S. citizens.  There is a fierce debate as to whether or 
not this move is legal. 
The legal debate over nonstatus could be avoided by legislative 
immigration reform to create a pathway to residency and citizenship 
for some portion of the unauthorized immigrant population.  
However, such a measure would still be controversial precisely 
because it would grant status instead of nonstatus.  During the 2013 
congressional debate over immigration reform, the most contentious 
subject was whether unauthorized immigrants should be granted a 
pathway to citizenship.327  Even when the pathway was lengthened to 
                                                           
 326. ICE FOIA Response, supra note 14. 
 327. See Sean Sullivan, Rand Paul and Why the ‘Pathway to Citizenship’ Question is So 
Delicate for the GOP, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/19/rand-paul-and-why-the-pathway-to-citizenship-question-
is-so-delicate-for-the-gop (internal quotation marks omitted) (pointing out the 
potential political and election ramifications members of Congress—particularly 
members of the Republican party—faced with respect to immigration reform). 
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more than a decade and strewn with obstacles, Congress still could 
not agree on such a measure.328 
It is perhaps natural that citizenship is so contested because, 
according to one view, it is no less than the “right to have rights.”329  
The embattled state of immigrant rights and benefits is perhaps part 
of the reason why nonstatus has become the default answer to the 
immigration policy debate.  Nonstatus comes with minimal rights and 
benefits, although even those have provoked an outcry. 
Therefore, nonstatus will probably continue to grow—an 
expanding limbo that reflects the United States polity’s deep 
ambivalence for immigrants and immigration law.  It is unfortunate 
that thus far, the nation has been unable to find a more satisfying 
answer to the policy and moral dilemmas posed by its large 
unauthorized immigrant population.  Persons with nonstatus often 
work, pay taxes, and add to the social fabric of the United States.  In 
some cases, such as that of the Dreamers, they have demonstrated 
tremendous courage and won the respect of a wide bipartisan 
coalition.  Hopefully, in the future they will also receive the benefits 
that they have earned through their contributions. 
                                                           
 328. Jaime Fuller, Americans Are Ready for Immigration Reform.  They Are Just Not Ready 
Enough, WASH. POST (July 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/ 
2014/07/14/americans-are-ready-for-immigration-reform-they-are-just-not-ready-enough. 
 329. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958). 
